

# Idealism and Psychoanalysis in Architecture

John Shannon Hendrix

The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate the role of philosophical idealism in Lacanian psychoanalysis, and the role that both play in thinking about architecture. As the perceived object is seen as a construction of the symbol in the conceptual function, the world as it is perceived is seen as being constructed by the human mind, a viewpoint generally referred to as idealism and associated with George Berkeley, Immanuel Kant, George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Ernst Cassirer. Kant defines transcendental idealism as the doctrine that empirical experience is only a form of representation in discursive reason, that phenomenal objects only exist in abstract sequences of cause and effect, in discursive reason, and that phenomenal objects have no existence in themselves outside of human thought. Transcendental idealism is also called formal idealism, to distinguish it from the material idealism associated with George Berkeley, according to which phenomenal objects do not exist at all. In transcendental idealism, space and time are representations which only exist in the mind. A priori intuition is also only known through representation, in space and time, as a phenomenon. It is not possible to know anything as real outside of empirical perception and the synthesis of apperception, which can only be understood as representations. Phenomena are only real in perception as representations, and perception is only real in empirical experience as a representation. Phenomenal objects do not exist outside of perception. Apperception, entailing the a priori synthesis of the manifold applied to phenomenal reality, is a false representation of the phenomenal world. Ernst Cassirer's concept of symbolic forms was influenced by Kant and Hegel, and in turn influenced Jacques Lacan's conception of the human subject, of the unconscious in psychoanalysis, as being composed of symbolic forms and signifiers in language. As it is composed of concepts of space and time, architecture can only be understood as a manifold composed in apperception, a combination of perceptions which are products of concepts. The experience of the perceiving subject is defined by signifiers and symbols in the process of representation, which results in an understanding of architecture.

## Cassirer

Ernst Cassirer distinguished between three stages in the development of thinking: the expressive function, the representational function, and the conceptual function. The distinctions can be found in *Language*, the first volume of *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*: Chapter 2: Language in the Phase of Sensuous Expression; Chapter 3: Language in the Phase of Intuitive Expression; and Chapter 4: Language as Expression of Conceptual Thought. The distinctions can also be found in *The Phenomenology of Knowledge*, the third volume of *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*. In the expressive function there is no distinction between the object of perception and the symbol; in the terms of structural linguistics, there is no distinction between the signifier and the signified. This is the case

for all animals except the human being; animals respond to sensory excitations and signs, but not symbols.

In the representational function in the human mind, or the phase of intuitive expression, according to Cassirer, the object of perception is separated from the symbol that is associated with it in language. A disjunction takes place, and the symbol or word becomes other than the object. Representation is thus the antithesis of the symbolic. The representation or *Darstellung* is associated with the *Vorstellung*, the image associated with the word, the phonetic sound in language, as in the signified in structural linguistics. The representation of Cassirer is as the *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz* of Sigmund Freud, the representation of the representation, or as Jacques Lacan says, that which takes the place of the representation. Cassirer's concept of the representational is grounded in the categories of a prior intuition of Immanuel Kant, in particular space and time, the concepts which underlay perceived reality, and which operate on an unconscious level. The schemata of the pure concepts of understanding of Kant serve to unify the representation of perceptual experience in a manifold or totality, uniting the perception and representation, which are then differentiated in conscious thought. The unifying representation in the transcendental schemata is the basis for the symbolic forms of Cassirer; in *Language*, the first volume of *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, "The schema is the unity of concept and intuition" (15).<sup>1</sup> The symbolic entails an ideational content (it is the basis of the formation of an idea), and it "embodies an original, formative power" (78), that is, it is the basis of the function of imagination. It is through the medium of intuitive forms, and through the intuition of space and time, that language can form impressions into representations (198). It is only through the transcendental schema that concepts of pure understanding can be applied to sensory intuitions (200). According to Kant, the image is a product of the empirical faculty of the productive imagination, while the schema is a product of a priori intuition or imagination, from which images come. For Cassirer, all intellectual representations in language must refer to the schema of the a priori intuition before they can be apprehended and represented sensuously.

In the third function of meaning, according to Cassirer, the conceptual function, the disjunction between perceived object and symbol is overcome, and the object is viewed as a construction of the symbol, and as a different kind of symbol. The conceptual function is a significative function based in pure categories of relations of concepts derived from the symbolic order and a priori intuition: pure relational concepts of mathematics and logic, abstracted and freed from the bounds of perception and perception-based knowledge. The intuitive concept is replaced by the relational concept. Cassirer's conceptual function sounds very much like the noetic thinking described by Plato in the Divided Line, freed from perception-based thinking. For Plato, noetic thinking is generated by the forms, outside the human mind, the eternal archetypal ideas. For Cassirer, noetic or conceptual thinking is generated by representational thinking, the unity of concept and intuition, as in the schemata of intuition of Kant. As the perceived object is seen as a construction of the symbol in the conceptual function, the world as it is perceived is seen as being constructed by the human mind: "... the coordinates and classifications of language contain a certain *ideality*, a tendency towards the objective unity of the 'idea'" (295). While his references are mostly to Kant, Cassirer said that Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the basis for his

theory of symbolic forms. The relational and significative operations of the conceptual function of Cassirer anticipate the symbolic order of Lacan in the unconscious, what Lacan called *signifiance*, the network of relations between signifiers that determines what is perceived, and the relation between the thinking subject and the Other, the matrix of relations between words, and between people, into which the subject is inserted.

Cassirer distinguished between man as defined by culture and man as organic or natural, as did Lacan. For Cassirer, man is a function of the symbol; for Lacan, man is a function of the signifier. In *The Phenomenology of Knowledge*, man is defined by an “intellectual impulse which forever drives the human spirit beyond the sphere of what is immediately perceived and desired” (277).<sup>2</sup> The products of culture—science, art, architecture, language—are symbolically created by man in order to give meaning to his life. According to Cassirer, only transcendental philosophy concerns itself exclusively with the manner of knowing objects in perception, rather than with the objects themselves (6). The world of perception “far from being a mere formless mass of impressions, already includes definite fundamental and original forms of synthesis” (8), the schemata of a priori intuition as described by Kant. The synthesis of apprehension or apperception is necessary for conscious thought, and originates in the unconscious. The synthetic unity of apprehension is the combination of sensation and understanding, and plays a role in all conceptual representation, and all imagination, both reproductive and productive. Language, as well, must be understood in relation to perception, “not only in the organization and articulation of the conceptual world, but also in the phenomenal structure of perception itself ...” (15). Language is understood through a fusion of metaphysics and psychology, as displayed in Berkeley’s *Principles of Human Knowledge*, where conceptual thought is understood as constructed by language (*Phenomenology of Knowledge*, 23). In order to understand the theoretical determination of being, all thought “instead of turning directly to reality, must set up a system of signs and learn to make use of these signs as representatives of objects” (45). It is only through representation that being can be seen as an ordered whole. A “totality of relations and connections” is established in thought which is derived from but separated from “particular things and events.” This is accomplished through the form of signs, which are subjected to a system of rules. The “pure *function* of representation is not attached to any concrete sensuous *material* ...” (113).

In *Language*, all language is representation through a sensuous sign (125). Perceived objects become images, and it is the image that expresses a concept that is inherent to it. The image in perception is the *eidon* in classical philosophy, as distinguished from the *morphe*, the material object. The *eidon*, according to Cassirer, creates an intermediary between language and cognition, like the *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz* of Freud. Language can never attain to pure being, according to Cassirer (126), because it is composed of objective attributes in the translation from object to image which prevent access to the noumenal, as Kant called it, beyond sensory perception. Concepts of language are not signs of perceived objects, but rather signs of the concepts formed of the perceived objects. Language does not represent the nature of objects, but rather our apprehension of objects, or in our mental operations. The concept of the object is always already embedded in the sign of the object. “For intellectual expression could not have developed through and out of sensuous expression if it had not originally been contained in it ...” (*Language*, 319).

Words in language are most often representations of complex combinations of perceptions, in apperception. Language “*begins* only where our immediate relation to sensory impression and sensory affectivity *ceases*” (*Phenomenology of Knowledge*, 189). Language replaces what are seen as more natural or organic functions.

### Lacan

According to Jacques Lacan, the subject and its unconscious, the Other or the symbolic order, are defined by culture in symbolic form, the superstructure of language, rules, codes, relationships, science, art and architecture. The unconscious constitutes the ego, but the ego misrecognizes the unconscious, and is alienated from it, in *méconnaissance*, misknowing. The products of culture, science and art, are manifestations of the mechanisms of language, symbolic structures, into which the subject inserts itself, and through which the subject loses itself. “For Freud’s discovery was that of the field of the effects in the nature of man of his relations to the symbolic order and the tracing of their meaning right back to the most radical agencies of symbolization in being” (64), as Lacan wrote in “The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis”<sup>3</sup> in 1953, echoing Cassirer. Further echoing Cassirer, “In order for the symbolic object freed from its usage to become the word freed from the *hic et nunc*, the difference resides not in its material quality as sound, but in its evanescent being in which the symbol finds the permanence of the concept” (65). Man is defined by symbolic forms, or signifiers, and man “speaks, then, but it is because the symbol has made him man.” The word or signifier or symbolic form is defined as a “presence made of absence” by Lacan because “the symbol manifests itself first of all as the murder of the thing” (104), that is, the word replaces the perceived object in representation, resulting in the perceived object being lost to the conceptual representation of it. That which takes the place of the representation in thinking is the *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz* described by Freud. The presence of the absence of the object of perception appears in the children’s game described by Freud, *Fort! Da!*, where the word replaces the absence of the mother and allows the infant to master the trauma of the situation by subjecting the phenomenal reality to a conceptual symbolic structure in thought. The game is an example of “the repetitive games in which subjectivity brings together mastery of its dereliction and the birth of the symbol” (103), thus the presence of the absence and the alienation of the subject from conscious experience. Representation in language is also the source of the desire of the subject, as “the moment in which desire becomes human is also that in which the child is born into language.”

Signifiers are provided by nature, according to Lacan, and “signifiers organize human relations in a creative way, providing them with structures and shaping them” (20), as described in *Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*.<sup>4</sup> The subject is determined by language and speech and “begins in the locus of the Other” (198), from which the first signifier emerges. The subject “solidifies into a signifier” (199) from nothing. “Everything emerges from the structure of the signifier” (206) in the form of a cut or a gap, the cut from the existence of the perceived object, the gap between conscious experience and unconscious representation. The signifier which arises from the Other, the symbolic form, can represent anything for anyone, so it represents no specific thing for no

specific subject, except as it relates to another subject, so the signifier is “that which represents a subject for another signifier” (207), and as such reduces the subject to nothing more than a signifier, nothing more than a conceptual product of language and culture.

Desire is the product of the splitting of the Lacanian subject between gestalt identification with the object in sensation and perception, and identification in the Other or symbolic order, the cultural superstructure and the basis of the unconscious, the splitting in which the unconscious is formed, in the repression of conscious identification as misrecognition, *méconnaissance*. The splitting occurs in the processes of language, in metaphor and metonymy, as the impossible representation of what the subject cannot know as itself. As Lacan wrote in *Écrits*, “it is the concrete incidence of the signifier in the submission of need to demand which, by repressing desire into the position of the misrecognized, gives the unconscious its order” (709).<sup>5</sup> Desire is maintained by language, as is the dehiscence of the subject, and the possibility of the unconscious, and “it is the nature of desire to radically torn” (166), as Lacan wrote in *Seminar II: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis 1945–1955*.<sup>6</sup> The desire of the subject is the desire of the Other, of the symbolic forms in culture, as the subject desires as soon as it enters into language.

As soon as the alienation is accomplished in the singular representation of the subject by a signifier to another signifier, according to Lacan, the subject is eliminated from any further signification, which becomes self-enclosed and inaccessible to the subject. The subject cannot access that by which it is constituted. “If we wish to grasp where the function of the subject resides in this signifying articulation, we must operate with two, because it is only with two that he can be cornered in alienation. As soon as there are three, the sliding becomes circular” (236), Lacan wrote in *Seminar XI*. The alienation is accomplished with the binary signifier, as “the signifier is that which represents the subject for the other signifier.” The binary signifier is also the mechanism of the *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz*, that which takes the place of the signified or the representation of the signifier. The representation which takes the place of the representation is the signifier which takes the place of the signifier, which represents the subject to it. The subject as the *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz* is the *Unterdrückung* of the binary signifier. The subject is self-alienated from its desire in an aphanisis or fading. The elision of the subject is the product of the binary subject in conscious discourse, in which the mechanisms of the unconscious, metaphor and metonymy, determine the subject unknown to itself. These mechanisms of the human psyche should be understood in order to conceive of how architecture, along with any other cultural product, is defined by and defines the human subject.

### Berkeley

In *An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision* in 1709, George Berkeley (1685–1753) asserted that the quality of distance, as in the qualities of space and time for Immanuel Kant, cannot be immediately perceived of itself, but must be a judgment which is learned through an accumulation of sense perceptions in relation to discursive thought. Judgment, according to Berkeley, or acquired understanding, is the product of experience rather than immediate sense perception; it is therefore necessarily the product of memory, of the

mnemonic residue in perception, the accumulation of which leads to the development of the imagination.

Berkeley wrote in the Fourth Dialogue of the *Alciphron*, “we perceive distance not immediately but by mediation of a sign, which has no likeness to it or necessary connection with it, but only suggests it from repeated experience, as words do things” (§8).<sup>7</sup> The sign is an abstraction from a particular, a product of discursive reason, which is itself a product of intelligibles. For Berkeley, in the same way that signs or signifiers, that is, words, in language immediately and unconsciously produce ideas or meanings, signs in the act of perception, such as distance relationships, immediately and unconsciously produce ideas and judgments about the perceived sensible world, in a process inaccessible to discursive reason, but which can be understood by discursive reason through the illumination of intuition. For Berkeley, perception functions as a language of signs.

The sign is constructed by reason in intellect, and has no necessary relation to the sense perception of the object, in a contradiction between form and function. As Berkeley explains in the *New Theory of Vision*, we are “exceedingly prone to imagine those things which are perceived only by the mediation of others to be themselves the immediate objects of sight” (§66),<sup>8</sup> just as in language we experience the immediate recognition of an idea, and not the mechanism by which the word conveys the idea. When we perceive an object, we are unaware that what we are perceiving is the sensible form of the object, which has no immediate connection to the object itself, and that the sensible form is formed in relation to the intelligible form, the idea of the form of the object, by the inaccessible *nous* or intuition. In the *Alciphron*, Berkeley asks, “may we not suppose that men, not resting in but overlooking the immediate and proper objects of sight as in their own nature of small moment, carry their attention onward to the very thing signified...?” (§12).

It is the idea of the object as given by intellect which is immediately grasped, the intelligible form, rather than the image itself of the object, the sensible form, which is imprinted on memory as a seal or sign. The objects themselves, according to Berkeley, “are not seen, but only suggested and apprehended by means of the proper objects of sight, which alone are seen.” The proper object of sight is the seal or sign, the imprint or mnemonic residue, the intelligible form, which are constructed in intellect and language, memory and imagination. In the *Alciphron*, the language of vision “is the same throughout the whole world, and not, like other languages, differing in different places,” thus “it will not seem unaccountable that men should mistake the connection between the proper objects of sight and the things signified by them to be founded in necessary relation or likeness...” (§11). It is thus “easy to conceive why men who do not think should confound in this language of vision the signs with the things signified,” the sensible form and the intelligible form (in this sense the thing signified), in discursive reason which has not advanced to intellection, not been illuminated by intuition, the source of the essential principles which constitute the universals or intelligibles which formulate the universal language of vision.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason* of Kant, it is impossible to know an object outside its conception as an intelligible in intellect; perception in intellection ultimately transcends the experience of the sensible world in perception. In order to experience the world, reason by necessity must make itself inaccessible to the world, resulting in a contradiction. For Kant, the coherence and totality of the sensible world are necessary for perception, as perception

is a basis for reason, but such totality is impossible in perception itself; thus reason exists on an impossible premise. As Kant wrote, “the absolute totality of all phenomena is only an idea, for as we never can present an adequate representation of it, it remains for us a *problem* incapable of solution” (206).<sup>9</sup> Reason is unrepresentable to itself, and requires the inaccessible *nous*, or intuition, in order for it to explain itself to itself. Imprints of sensible objects in perception “are mere representations, receiving from perceptions alone significance and relation to a real object, under the condition that this or that perception—indicating an object—is in complete connection with all others in accordance with the rules of the unity of experience” (280). There is a disjunction in the relation between the sensible form as it is perceived and the sensible object, and between the sensible form and the intelligible form. “Reason never has an immediate relation to an object; it relates immediately to the understanding alone” (360), the intellection of the object. The transcendental idea, then, is not just an idea of an object, but a “conception of the complete unity of the conceptions of objects...” (361). The idea of an object is not possible outside the totality of the unity of objects: the sensible is not possible without the intelligible. The object is singular while the idea of it is synthetic, thus the idea of the object cannot possibly correspond to the object.

The distinction or contradiction between the sensible form and the intelligible form can be seen in relation to the distinction or contradiction between the signifier and the signified in language. The distinction between the signifier and the signified in language can be found in the writings of René Descartes in the seventeenth century, who anticipated Ferdinand de Saussure in the twentieth century by asserting that the signifier, the particular word, does not have an immediate relation with the signified, the idea that is associated with it. As Descartes stated in *The World, or a Treatise on Light and the Other Principal Objects of the Senses*, in 1664, “words do not in any way resemble the things they signify” (85);<sup>10</sup> the relationship between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary, and reveals a disjunction between thought and the sensible world, as does the relation between the sensible form and the intelligible form. Nevertheless, for Descartes “that does not prevent them from causing us to think about those things, often without us even noticing the sound of the words or their syllables...”; the sensible form functions in discursive reason and perception without awareness of its connection to the intelligible form.

According to Descartes, the contradiction between signifier and signified is present in perception, which functions as a language of signs. Descartes asks, “Now if words—which have meaning only as a result of a human convention—are enough to make us think about things that do not resemble them in any way, why is it not possible that nature may also have established a particular sign which would make us have the sensation of light, even though such a sign contains nothing in itself that resembles the sensation?” The sign is constructed by reason in intellect, and has no necessary relation to the sense perception of the object; it would correspond to the sensible form, which is a product of the intelligible form rather than the immediate perception of the sensible object.

In a revised edition of the *New Theory of Vision*, called *The Theory of Vision or Visual Language Vindicated and Explained*, published in 1733, Berkeley attempted to present a more scientific explanation for the disjunction or contradiction between the sensible object and the sign of it in perception, the signifier and the signified. The explanation is based on

the phenomenon of the inversion of the projected image of the object onto the retina of the eye, which does not correspond to the object itself. The image is created by “pencils of rays issuing from any luminous object,” which “after their passage through the pupil and their refraction by the crystalline, delineate inverted pictures in the retina...” (§49).<sup>11</sup> These pictures, which are “supposed the immediate proper objects of sight,” do not correspond in orientation to the object itself. In classical optics, the sensible straight line appears to the eye as a curved line, as it is distorted by the retina. In both cases, the sensible form has been revised by the intelligible form, in order for the sensible world to be ordered.

Berkeley’s explanation is that the image, the sensible form, and the mechanisms of inversion and refraction, cannot be taken as a true picture of an object, but must be taken as an image existing independently of the sensible object, the intelligible form. For Berkeley, “the retina, crystalline, pupil, rays crossing, refracted, and reunited in different images, correspondent and similar to the outward objects, are things altogether of a tangible nature,” like words in a language which have no necessary relation to the ideas which they represent, as a kind of picture in the *oculus mentis*. For Berkeley the pictures on the retina are tangible objects themselves which are “so far from being the proper objects of sight that they are not at all perceived thereby” (§50), but “apprehended by the imagination alone.” It is necessary in the experience and perception of architecture that it is impossible to know a building in its phenomenal essence or existence as a “thing in itself,” just like it is impossible to know phenomena in general, without the mediation of the concept or transcendental idea with what is perceived. The contradiction between the sensible form and intelligible form, between perception and understanding, between matter and mind, is present in the thought of Cassirer, Berkeley, Kant and Hegel, as it is throughout the history of Western philosophy.

### Kant

The distinction between the real and the ideal, the sensible and intelligible, as it may be applied to architecture, is present in the a priori categories of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). In the transcendental aesthetic of Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), what we perceive to be space and time do not actually exist outside of our thought. Geometry and mathematics are abstract representations of space and time which have no basis in the sensory world. As architecture is lineament, geometry and mathematics, it can be inferred that it only exists in thought as a representation of space and time. It can be concluded that architecture itself is an a priori category, projected onto the material or the real, as are space and time.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, knowledge can only relate to sensible objects by means of intuition. “In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate to objects, it is at least quite clear, that the only manner in which it immediately relates to them, is by means of an intuition” (21).<sup>12</sup> The object, or phenomenon, is the “undetermined object of an empirical intuition.” The phenomenon consists of matter and form; the matter is that part of the phenomenon which corresponds to sensation, while the form is that part of the phenomenon which can be “arranged under certain relations.” The matter of the phenomenon corresponds to the sensible form or *species sensibilis* of the Commentators



on Aristotle, as opposed to the intelligible form, the *species apprehensibilis*, which corresponds to the form of the phenomenon for Kant. Both the matter and the form of the phenomenon are determined a priori; the a priori conception of the sensible form results in the perception of the form, while the a priori conception of the intelligible form results in the understanding of the phenomenon as part of a synthetic whole in the ordering of the phenomenal world.

Sensibility, the capacity for receiving representations, is the source of intuition, which allows sensible objects to be thought in understanding, from which arise conceptions. Objects, and intuitions, are given by sensibility; they are thought in the “understanding,” from which arise conceptions. Thought is related to intuition, and to sensibility, by signs or symbols. For Kant, sensible objects can only be thought as representations. All material forms in architecture are representations, as are all words in a language. Sensations cannot arrange themselves or assume certain forms; forms must exist a priori in the mind, and be seen as separate from sensation. In the pure forms of sensuous intuition which exist in the mind a priori, “all the manifold content of the phenomenal world is arranged and viewed under certain relations” (22). Architecture already involves the ordering of the phenomenal world by a priori sensuous intuition, and it should be understood as such so that it can facilitate intellectual development.

Kant distinguished between the sensation and the intelligible, as the intelligible entails an arrangement of sensations, and the sensation assuming a form. The matter of phenomena is given a posteriori, following the form of phenomena in the mind; the a priori form must thus be seen as separate from sensation, and juxtaposed to it, in a contradiction. What is a priori in the mind is the transcendental, pure form of sensuous intuition, which arranges the manifold and varied content of the phenomenal world. The manifold content of the phenomenal world is arranged and viewed under a certain set of arrangements, which are determined by intuition, and concept in understanding. Objects can only exist in perception insofar as they are in a certain relation to other objects; objects cannot exist in perception without a relation to other objects. In the transcendental concepts of time and space, a moment in time cannot exist without a relation to other moments in time, and a point in space cannot exist without a relation to other points in space. Time, space, and the manifold of phenomenal objects in perception thus can only exist in a conceptual continuity, a reality manufactured by human reason. Architecture, as the sequential organization of space, only exists as a manifold continuity manufactured by human reason. Architectural forms only exist in relation to other architectural forms. Architecture is a projection of an a priori intuition, a manufactured totality, onto the phenomenal world. It entails the coexistence of the ideal and the real, the intuitive and the sensible, which constitute a contradiction in understandings.

Kant defines the “Transcendental Aesthetic” as the “science of all the principles of sensibility *à priori*...” (22). There are two pure forms of sensuous intuition, which are principles of a priori knowledge: space and time. Space and time are not “real existences,” but rather “merely relations or determinations of things...” (23). Space and time are not concepts which have been developed from outward or empirical experience in their entirety, but rather entail a dialectic between empirical experience and concept in understanding, manifest as intuition. Pure empirical experience does not exist. External or

empirical experience is itself only possible as a result of a priori intuition, as sense experience is conditioned by what is understood in the mind. The perception of a sensible form is determined by an understanding of the corresponding intelligible form in the mind. A phenomenal object can only be perceived once it is understood in its relation to the totality or manifold of reality, as constructed in the mind. A form in architecture can only be perceived as it is understood a priori in relation to other forms in architecture, which constitute the totality or manifold of architecture. It is impossible to think of architecture without space, or time, thus space cannot be said to exist as a physical phenomenon. As a manifold totality constructed a priori in intuition, architecture cannot be said to exist as a physical phenomenon, but rather only as a concept.

The structural and functional requirements of architecture exist in the phenomenal world as products of the a priori concepts of space and time, in the relation of a posteriori perceived matter in relation to a priori conceptualized relations. The visual forms of architecture, when they are in direct relationship to the structural and functional requirements, are as the visual forms of matter, in relation to the manifold concepts of matter in a cause and effect relationship, as given by reason. If the visual forms of architecture contradict the structural and functional requirements, then the mechanisms by which architecture, and sensible reality, are understood in reason and perception, are revealed; the contradiction between the sensible object as perceived matter and a priori transcendental intuition is revealed. Architecture thus functions as philosophy, to examine and reveal the mechanisms of reason and perception, in order to describe the relationship between the human mind and the phenomenal world.

Space is a necessary a priori representation, and it is the condition for the possibility of all phenomena. It is impossible to conceive of the nonexistence of space; for that reason alone space cannot be seen as a phenomenal reality. It is also impossible to conceive of the nonexistence of time, and all relationships are perceived in space and time. Modern physics tells us that the universe had a definite beginning and will have a definite end in both spatial and temporal terms, but it is impossible to conceive of anything prior to or posterior to space and time, just like it is impossible to conceive of experience after death, except as a mythology. Architecture is also a necessary a priori representation; it is impossible to conceive of the nonexistence of architecture, thus architecture cannot be seen as a phenomenal reality. While space and time, and architecture, are manifest in discursive reason as containing relationships within a manifold totality, they themselves cannot be concepts of relationships, but rather pure intuitions, a priori concepts which are formed prior to sensory experience, much like the archetype or intelligible in classical philosophy, in the active intellect or intellectual principle, *nous*, which is manifest in intelligible form in relation to sensible form, or the unconscious in psychoanalysis. Following the intuitions of space and time, geometry and mathematics are also products of a priori intuition, thus architecture.

According to Kant, space is not a concept which is derived from outward experience, nor from relations between external phenomena. External experience is on the contrary only possible through the antecedent representation of space. Space is a necessary a priori representation; all conceptions of space are based on a priori intuition, as are the principles of geometry. Space is not a discursive concept, as it cannot be divided or multiplied.

Architecture thus depends on a priori intuition in perception, rather than on sensory perception or discursive reason. It is impossible to think of architecture without space, thus space does not exist as a physical phenomenon, and it is reasonable to conclude that architecture does not exist as a physical phenomenon; architecture only exists as it is understood in the mind, as in the signified of Vitruvius or the lineament of Alberti.

Geometrical principles are apodictic, necessary truths. Rather than being based in the fragmented variability and malleability of the phenomenal world, they are a priori intuitions applied to reality. They cannot be varied to conform to sensible phenomena; rather, sensible phenomena must conform to them. The organization of a building must conform to a priori, universal rules of mathematics and geometry; the building is thus taken out of its phenomenal existence, and through architecture it enters into a transcendental existence. Mathematics and geometry, time and space, are not properties inherent to sensible objects which have an existence insofar as they are in conformance with a manifold set of rules and principles. Space is not a quality of an object, nor is it a quality of relations between objects; it has no relation to sensible objects other than as providing a field in which sensible objects can be perceived and understood. The mathematics and geometry in architecture which organize a building in time and space have no relation to the material forms of the architecture, other than as providing a field in which elements of a building can be organized as architecture. An element of a building is transformed into an architectural form when it is understood in relation to mathematics and geometry, that is when it is transformed from a phenomenal object to a transcendental object of intuition and perception, from the real to the ideal, or the sensible to the intelligible, from any existence "in itself" to an existence determined a priori in intuition. The existence of the architectural form in intuition contradicts the existence of the matter of the building element in phenomena. In psychoanalysis, the existence of the architectural form as representation would contradict, replace or repress its existence as matter, as the perceived object is represented by the signifier in language.

The experience of a building as architecture depends on the a priori intuition of time, as temporal succession and coexistence do not exist in the phenomenal world. A part of time cannot be understood outside of the manifold of time, as a part of space cannot be understood outside the manifold of space. Time and space are, rather than qualities of the phenomenal world, qualities of the intuition of the perceiving subject. Time and space determine the "relation of representations in our internal state" (30), the representations of perceived phenomena. Time and space function as a syntax for the language of internal representation; they are the mechanism by which perceptions are organized and understood. Meaning is created in language through a relationship between signifiers, so time is a necessary a priori intuition for meaning in language, and the communication of meaning in the visual language of architecture, which also requires a syntax, an underlying matrix of rules of representation, which include mathematics and geometry, in order for meaning in representation to be communicated insofar as it participates in a manifold.

All communication in language requires a shared acceptance of a manifold, composed of syntactical rules based in the a priori intuitions of space and time. Space and time are constructed, artificial mechanisms through which all thought, language, communication, meaning and architecture are generated. If space and time do not exist other than as

transcendental intuitions in the mind, then their grounding for all communication and meaning reveals a void within all communication and meaning, and within human identity. Meaning and communication have a metaphysical basis which is not to be found in phenomenal reality. Any meaning or communication which is achieved in a syntax in language, including the language of architectural forms, cannot be related to the phenomenal existence of the signifiers in the language, or the matter of the architectural elements. The metaphysical function of architecture certainly contradicts its material function.

Space and time, as internal a priori intuitions, can provide no form themselves, but can only be represented in forms, in formal analogies, such as cyclical or linear progression. The perception of a sensible object requires a dialectic between the sensible form of the object and the intelligible understanding of the object, as a relation in a manifold, which is given a sensible form in representation, what Sigmund Freud would call the *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz*. Space and time can only be represented through figural language, in linguistic tropes; they cannot be represented in literal language, because they do not exist in the phenomenal world. Architecture represents space and time through the tropic language of mathematics and geometry. Architecture can only be understood as existing within and determined by the manifold framework of space and time which it represents through the figural tropes of mathematics and geometry in its execution and experience. Architecture, and human reason, are thus defined by a metaphysical foundation which does not actually exist, but is represented by analogies in its nonexistence. Communication and meaning in language and architecture, if they have resonance, incorporate the metaphysical void which is their basis.

It is impossible to perceive space or time; only relations within space and time can be perceived, as they have been determined in a priori intuition. It is thus impossible to perceive the epistemological basis of architecture; its basis is taken for granted as a transcendental a priori intuition, which is not a quality of the architecture or reality themselves. The immediate condition of all internal, subjective phenomena, in perception and intellection, mediates all external phenomena in perception and intellection. Space and time are the modes of representation of the perceiving and thinking subject as object. In Hegelian terms, reason becomes aware of itself in consciousness, and objectifies itself, through the representations of space and time. Space and time are the conditions of the sensibility of the subject, the conditions of the subjective experience of reality, which is the necessary basis of reality. Space and time are the representations from which all “synthetical cognitions can be drawn” (33), which include geometry and mathematics in discursive or cognitive thought, and thus the concept of architecture. Architecture is an expression of the human condition insofar as the human condition is a subjective representation, and not an external reality.

As for George Berkeley, empirical experience is necessary in the development of concepts from intuition, according to Kant, for example the concept of change based in the intuition of time, as the succession of the determinations of an object. Empirical intuition is also a subjective experience, as relations between objects in space and time do not exist without the subjective constitution of the senses, or the perception of the subject. Objects are transformed into relations given by representations in intuition. It is impossible to know

phenomenal objects outside of the subjective sensation of them, outside the subjective mode of perceiving them, which is a universal representation of a manifold. It is also impossible to know the mechanisms by which objects are represented in intuition in the framework of space and time; it is thus impossible to have complete knowledge of either the object or the subject in human perception. The human being is caught in a play of mirrors as it were, having access only to the subjective condition of human experience, with no accessible basis in either the phenomenal or cognitive worlds. Architecture is a product of the play of mirrors; it is a conceptual mediation between intuition and phenomena, neither of which are entirely accessible. Architecture remains eternally a labyrinth, the ur-architectural form which represented the identity of life and death, the temporal and eternal, and the infinitely confining and infinitely expansive in the human understanding of the human condition. It is impossible to know a building architecturally outside the intuition of architecture, which is inaccessible, and it is impossible to know a building outside the concept of architecture.

Cognition only consists of relations in discursive reason, as given by a priori intuitions. It is impossible to know a thing in itself in phenomena through its relations, to either other things or the perceiving subject. The relations of a thing are determined in the manifold of intuition; particular relations cannot be known or perceived outside the transcendental matrix of relations as given by intuition. All relations between phenomenal objects are representations of a priori relations in intuition; the reality of phenomena plays itself out only as it has been drawn up in the imagination. A building functions as architecture only to the extent that the architectural relations of the building, within the framework of space and time, mathematics and geometry, have been drawn up in the imagination, or in intuition. Phenomenal forms in reality are representations of forms in the imagination or intuition as they interact with the discursive functions of cognition.

The human mind represents itself to itself through those representational forms, not through the mechanisms of intuition, which are inaccessible. Just like for Lacan a signifier represents the subject for another signifier. Thus the forms of human thought and perception cannot be corresponded to the functions of human thought and perception, and can be seen as contradictory, because the functions are inaccessible despite the reality of the representational forms. The representational forms of architecture correspond to the reality of the human mind, which attempts to have access to itself, and the phenomenal world, through formal representation, resulting from the interaction of intuition and sensibility, but in fact cannot, and is deluded into having such access by the reality of the forms in perception and cognition. Like the shadows on the wall of the prison in the Allegory of the Cave, the forms of sensible reality contradict both the function of sensible reality and the function of the perceiving subject. The object as it appears and is conceived in perception and cognition cannot be equated with the object as it exists as a thing in itself, and the object as a thing in itself cannot be seen within the framework of space and time, the a priori intuitions which transform the object into a perceived form.

Knowledge consists of the power of receiving representations and the power of cognizing by means of these representations, according to Kant. Sensible objects are received as representations by a priori intuition, as forms. The forms of architecture are perceived as representations in intuition. Sensible objects are cognized as forms of thought,

transformed into signs and symbols, understood as abstracted universals, a posteriori. A priori cognition, insofar as it is dependent on understanding, is made possible by a synthesis or conjunction of a manifold of conceptions in relation to the “unity of apperception” (86), the synthesis of multiple singular perceptions of sensible objects. The synthesis is “not merely transcendental, but also purely intellectual,” and “the synthesis of the manifold of sensuous intuition, which is possible and necessary *à priori*, may be called figurative (*synthesis speciosa*)” (87), as opposed to “conjunction of the understanding (*synthesis intellectualis*),” in cogitation, which is also a priori. The mechanisms of intuition are known by analogy, in tropic language, of the imagination. It can be said that the architecture of a building, as it entails a synthesis of the manifold material parts of the building, can be seen as a priori cognition or intuition, as a model or catechism of the processes of perception and intellection, in an expression of the human condition. As Kant says, “human reason is by nature architectonic” (269), requiring an a priori unity, and accepting only principles which are part of a possible system.

Figurative synthesis is distinguished from intellectual synthesis: the intellectual synthesis occurs in discursive reason, in cogitation, while the figurative synthesis is related to the original synthetic unity of apperception and the transcendental unity which is the object of cogitation. Figurative synthesis is thus labeled “the transcendental synthesis of imagination” (87), imagination being “the faculty of representing an object even without its presence in intuition,” belonging to sensibility. Architecture, for example, exists in the imagination, as a transcendental synthesis, and that transcendental synthesis is projected onto the material form of a building. Intuition cannot be separated from sensibility, but at the same time intuition can only be known figuratively, through representations, as a product of language. Architecture, thus, is a product of language, figural or tropic language in particular. Architecture is a product of the imagination.

The productive imagination in intuition is distinguished from the “reproductive” imagination in discursive reason or cogitation, which depends on empirical laws of association, and can in no way explain a priori intuition or the transcendental synthesis. Reproductive, cogitative imagination depends on visual representation, as the visual sensible forms of objects, which have been received based on the principles of the a priori synthesis, have been transformed into universals by those principles, in a dialectical relation. A geometrical line or a circle cannot be “cogitated” unless they are represented visually, by drawing them in thought. Architecture thus cannot be thought unless it is represented visually, and figuratively, in the imagination. The dimensions of space cannot be thought without the representation of lines drawn perpendicular to each other. The representation of architecture is thus necessary in the representation of space; architecture, as a mediation between the human mind and the phenomenal world, also functions as a mediation between discursive reason and intuition. Architecture mediates between thought and both the external world and the internal world.

Time cannot be thought unless it is represented by drawing a straight line, which functions as an external figurative representation of an intuition, and leads to the synthesis of the manifold in intuition, in the internal world of the mind. The visual figurative representation allows time as the synthesis of the manifold to be cognized in unities and variabilities of dimensions, which must conform to the principles of the a priori synthesis,

but which operate in the empirical laws of association in the reproductive imagination, which produces the visual figurative representation. The lines of architecture are visual, figurative representations, linguistic tropes, which function as analogies of the synthetic intuitions of space and time, which do not exist in the phenomenal world. Architecture is an intellectual diagramming of the representation by the mind of the phenomenal world to itself, as the lines of architecture are projected onto matter. At the same time, because architecture can only be representation, in relation to the phenomenal world and intuition, architecture prevents us from knowing either external or internal world, as does language. Architecture is a form of language, and both the phenomenal world and the inner workings of intuition are only known through representation in language; we can only know what is given by language, and anything outside of language is inaccessible.

The thinking self, the subject, can only be represented through representation in language to itself as well, so the self can only know itself as reified object in representation in consciousness, not as thinking subject. The self can only be cognized as an object of thought, as it appears in representation, rather than as it is. It is impossible to know oneself, except in external relations given by discursive reason, in the same way that objects are not knowable in themselves, and intuition is not knowable in cognition. Thus “we cognize our own subject only as phenomenon, and not as it is in itself” (90). The a priori forms of internal and external sensuous intuition are represented in space and time, and the representations of space and time must always conform to the synthesis of the apprehension of the manifold in phenomena. The forms of representation are not possible without the synthesis, and the synthesis is not possible without the forms of representation. Intuition and sensibility are locked together in a dialectical relationship, in a transcendental idealism. The forms of representation, based on perceived sensible forms, are a product of the a priori intuition to begin with, through the construction of the intelligible form. As space and time are intuitions, a priori figurative representations of a manifold synthesis, and all cognition and perception must conform to the laws of space and time, intuition must be a priori to perception as well as cognition. It follows that architecture as representation, as both thought and perceived, must conform to the laws of the a priori intuition, although architecture can only be known through external relations, in discursive reason.

Space is represented as a phenomenal object, in the necessity of its visual representation in geometry. The representation of space thus requires both the a priori synthesis of the manifold in intuition, and a “form of sensibility,” the visual representation, which is the form of the intuition or a “formal intuition” itself. The synthesis of the manifold which makes perception possible (as representation), must conform to the mechanisms of discursive reason, as the mechanisms of discursive reason must conform to the a priori synthesis. Experience is defined as “cognition by means of conjoined perceptions” (92), which can be called apperception. As apperception occurs according to the “categories” in discursive reason which are derived from intuition, the categories are thus “conditions of the possibility of experience.” Perceptual experience is made possible by intuition by way of cognition or discursive reason. Perception is a form of thinking, as in the *Vorstellung* of Hegel or the *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz* of Freud.

As Kant wrote, when “I make the empirical intuition of a house by apprehension of the manifold contained therein into a perception, the *necessary unity* of space and of my

external sensuous intuition lies at the foundation of this act...” (92). Without the a priori intuition, apperception, cognition and discursive reason would not be possible. The form of the house is drawn according to the synthetic unity of the manifold in space, which does not exist in phenomena, but rather only in the mind. Sensual perception and apprehension must conform to the synthesis of apperception, which is intellectual and a priori, and which is also spontaneous (and unconscious) in imagination and understanding. It is impossible to perceive or understand a form in architecture or phenomena without an understanding of the synthetic unity or manifold, just as it is impossible to understand the meaning of a word outside a syntax. It is necessary to understand the mechanisms of thought and perception in order to understand architecture; the mechanisms of thought and perception are not completely accessible to thought itself, and must in part be ascribed to a priori intuition, or the mechanisms of unconscious thought. Architecture, if it is to accurately represent human thought and perception, should contain a metaphysical element that is not immediately accessible to sensory perception or discursive reason, but which can be understood through higher forms of intellection, in advanced forms of conceptual representation.

Thought is the condition for the possibility of architecture, as it is the condition for the possibility of experience. The subject draws “the form of the house conformably to this synthetical unity of the manifold in space,” in geometrical representation. The synthetic unity is taken as a category of the a priori synthesis in intuition; the category exists in abstraction, in the visual representation of space in geometry, processed in discursive reason as a quantity, in a sequence of relationships, which conform to the manifold synthesis, as the manifold synthesis conforms to the categories. A perception must conform to the categories and the manifold synthesis, in the dialectic of sensibility and intuition which constitutes human thought for Kant. The synthesis of empirical apprehension must conform to the synthesis of intellectual apperception, in a spontaneous production which can be called both imagination and understanding. Neither the empirical apprehension nor the intellectual apperception is prior, as both depend on the synthesis of the intuition.

As phenomena are represented as quantities, as abstractions in relation to the a priori synthesis, in mathematics and geometry, for example, a phenomenon can only be understood as a quantity in relation to a whole, which is the a priori synthesis of the manifold in apperception. A line can only be represented in relation to the points which constitute it in a series of relationships, but drawing the line in thought does not require a reconstruction of all the relationships of the points; drawing the line in thought, as a visual representation, can be done by intuition. All phenomena are understood in intuition in extension, in successive synthesis in apprehension. All phenomena are thus aggregates, formed from “previously given parts” (115), conforming to the synthesis of the manifold. No phenomenon can be apprehended outside of a relation to the a priori synthesis, and apperception in experience. It follows that architecture depends on the synthesis of the representation of parts in extension, as an aggregate. Through architecture, space can be represented as a phenomenon, in the aggregate of abstract geometrical representation. Geometry and mathematics are aggregates of extension based on the “successive synthesis of the productive imagination” (116), as opposed to the reproductive imagination in discursive reason, in the generation of tropic figures. The aggregates of extension of



geometry and mathematics compose the “schema of a pure conception of external intuition,” in the categories of discursive reason in representation, in the conditions of the a priori intuition.

Mathematics is applied to experience according to the transcendental principle of a priori cognition. A concept is schematic, based on the principles of intuition. All phenomena can be seen as mathematical, insofar as they conform to the mathematical principles of cognition in the schema. Architecture, as mathematics and geometry, can also be seen to be applied to experience. The phenomenal world is experienced architecturally, insofar as it is experienced mathematically and geometrically. Thought is architectonic in Kant’s system, and architecture mediates the experience of the phenomenal world. All objects of sense conform to the rules of construction in space, no matter what kind of construction that might be. Different philosophical systems propose different models of the construction of space, but space must be constructed in some way in any philosophical system. All apprehension and cognition depend on an architectural construction of space, which entails the aggregates of phenomena in extension in relationships of parts which conform to a synthetic whole, as represented by space and time. All perception, in apprehension, and all models of vision, depend on the architectonic construction of space.

Experience is defined by Kant as an “empirical cognition” (122); a phenomenal object is determined by cognition through perception, in a temporal sequence, conforming to the a priori synthesis of the manifold, which constitutes “experience.” Experience is thus apperception, a synthesis of perceptions, which is not contained in an individual perception, but which contains the synthetic a priori unity of the manifold of perception, as does intuition. The synthetic unity makes the perception and cognition of a phenomenal object possible, and it makes experience possible, but only through representation. It follows that architecture can be seen as a schematic or conceptual model for perception and experience, as they are represented in visual forms which conform to the synthetic a priori unity, and to the principles and mechanisms of cognition in relation to intuition. Individual perceptions, and phenomenal objects perceived individually, have no necessary relation to each other until they are submitted to the manifold of apperception, in spatial and temporal sequences, which as representations of intuition, organize individual perceptions in experience so that they may be apprehended as part of a whole, as part of an all-encompassing allegory or narrative sequence of tropes or signs, which constitute the whole, which is given a priori.

Experience is only possible in the representation of the synthetic manifold, and “by means of a representation of the necessary connection of perception.” Individual perceptions, which have no connection or relation to each other in themselves, any more than individual phenomenal objects have a connection to each other in themselves, must be seen to be necessary in their connections to each other for experience to be possible. The necessary connection between perceptions is only possible within the a priori synthesis in intuition. Without an intuition of the totality of experience, individual perceptions, like words in sentences, would make no sense in relation to each other, as in a condition of psychosis. The necessary connection between perceptions only exists in representation; they do not exist in experience, but rather experience is a product of the necessary connections in representation. It is impossible to know experience in the same way that it

is impossible to know intuition, as experience can only be represented in spatial and temporal terms, through abstract visual forms, in the same way that the phenomenal objects of perception in experience are represented.

In architecture, the structural and functional requirements of a building are the product of necessary connections between perceptions in cognition, therefore they can only be known as representations conforming to the a priori synthesis of the whole which is "architecture." The different structural and functional requirements of a building, as relations or connections between phenomenal objects, exist independently but are apprehended in apperception to form the architectural whole. If the form of the architectural elements corresponds to the function, then the architecture can be apprehended as the phenomenal world is apprehended, as a necessary sequence of connections in apperception. But if the form of the architectural elements contradicts their function, the architectural elements as phenomenal objects can be seen as existing in themselves independent of the synthesis in apperception which is the a priori intuition. The contradiction between form and function in architecture pulls the veil away, as in the Allegory of the Cave, and reveals the scaffolding of perception and comprehension. Architectural elements are revealed as existing independently of the a priori synthesis of the manifold, or as existing in an a priori synthesis which is not given by the material forms of the architecture, but by the metaphysical, transcendental intuition which is applied to the materiality of the architecture, as the framework of human thought is projected onto experience in perception, and onto the phenomenal world.

The connection of perceptions in a temporal sequence, resulting in apperception, is a "product of a synthetical faculty of imagination" (128), combining sensation and intuition, and determining an internal sense of time. Apperception, the comprehension of the phenomenal world as a totality of experience, is a product of imagination through representation; experience is a product of imagination. The architectonic framing of the phenomenal world in apperception, the architecture of reality, is imaginative, the product of figural representation in language. Space and time are not objects of perception, and the sequential relations between objects in space and time cannot be perceived, they can only be apprehended, based on the representation of the a priori intuition of the synthetic manifold. The experience of architecture is thus the product of imagination; it cannot be the product of direct perception. This is revealed in architecture in the contradiction between form and function, which reveals the contradiction between the apparent perception of spatial and temporal sequences, and the temporal and spatial sequences as representations. The connections between forms in architecture are only known through a priori intuitions preceding individual perceptions, in the same way that meaning in language is only generated through a priori intuition represented in the syntax of the language.

The connections between forms in the experience of architecture, like the connections between phenomenal objects in experience, are undetermined by perception. The connections between forms are only given as they are cogitated in discursive reason as necessary, in order to conform to the a priori manifold synthesis, though in external reality they do not exist. The conception of the necessity of relations is independent of perception and is the product of pure apprehension, which results in apperception. The conception is

“of the relation of cause and effect” in the categories of discursive reason. Experience, the empirical cognition of phenomena, is possible only on the condition of the conception of cause and effect, as all phenomena are subject to the law of causality, in representation in imagination. All phenomena, conversely, are only possible because of the law of causality. The experience of architecture, for example, is dependent on the law of causality, which is not present in perception, thus the perception of the form of the architecture contradicts the sequential function of the architecture as an aggregate of phenomenal objects in matter.

The apprehension or comprehension of phenomena requires that each phenomenon have a specific position in relation to other phenomena in space and time, which is determined in a priori intuition. A perception becomes empirical experience only because what is perceived has been determined a priori as having a specific place in space and time. The perceived object can thus be placed in apperception according to a rule or schema which governs the apprehension of it in perception. In architecture, for example, a door (as it is understood as an architectural element within the schema of cause and effect in the law of causality) is perceived in relation to a room, or a space to which it provides access. The door is understood as a door in spatial and temporal sequences, but it is not perceived individually as such; it is rather comprehended as such in apperception. If the form of the door contradicts its function, then the door can be understood as a phenomenal object of perception which is submitted to the framework of apprehension in intuition through representation.

The manifold synthesis of phenomena is a transcendental idea. A transcendental idea is a pure conception of reason, and a necessary conception of reason, “to which no corresponding object can be discovered in the world of sense” (205), like the Platonic archetype. Transcendental ideas are necessary products of reason which define empirical cognition as determined by a priori intuition in the synthesis of the manifold. The transcendental idea can never exist completely in phenomena, and phenomena can never be adequate to the synthesis of the transcendental idea. The totality of phenomena, which is given in perception through intuition, is only an idea, which cannot be completely represented, though it is adequately represented in sequences of forms and signs in space and time. The totality of phenomena, the basis of empirical experience, perception and apprehension, is thus “a *problem* incapable of solution” (206). It is impossible to know the phenomenal world, or the mechanisms by which the phenomenal world is known in representation.

Human reason is “architectonic” in that all thoughts or cognitions conform to a possible system, in the same way that all phenomenal objects exist in sequences of relationships. A building, as a collection of phenomenal objects in sequences of relationships, can never be adequate to an architectural idea, the transcendental idea in intuition, because the pure idea can never be completely represented in the phenomenal world. Architecture, like all forms of human expression, is propelled by the fact that it can never be complete, just like the human being can never be complete, because the relation between the transcendental idea and concrete phenomena can never be resolved. The continuous quest for completion by the incomplete subject, in its reason and poetic expression (as in architecture), results in desire, as Freud or Lacan would have it, wholeness being the inaccessible object of desire. Thus is the desire of architecture, the impossibility of the representation of the void at the

center of being, given by the impossibility of knowing either the self or the phenomenal world.

Kant defines transcendental idealism as the doctrine that empirical experience is only a form of representation in discursive reason, that phenomenal objects only exist in abstract sequences of cause and effect, in discursive reason, and that phenomenal objects have no existence in themselves outside of human thought. Transcendental idealism is also called formal idealism, to distinguish it from the material idealism associated with George Berkeley, according to which phenomenal objects do not exist at all. In transcendental idealism, space and time are representations which only exist in the mind. A priori intuition is also only known through representation, in space and time, as a phenomenon. It is not possible to know anything as real outside of empirical perception and the synthesis of apperception, which can only be understood as representations. Phenomena are only real in perception as representations, and perception is only real in empirical experience as a representation. Phenomenal objects do not exist outside of perception. Apperception, entailing the a priori synthesis of the manifold applied to phenomenal reality, is a false representation of the phenomenal world.

The contradiction between form and function in architecture reveals apperception to be a false representation of the phenomenal world, which does not exist or cannot be known outside of the false representation. Intuition known through representation is likewise a false representation of the self, the source of the architectonic system which is applied to phenomenal reality. The contradiction between form and function in architecture also reveals the false representation of the thinking subject to itself, the impossibility of knowing the mechanisms of cognition, the source of the architectonic, through representation, without contradiction. The architectonic, and architecture, are concepts which are necessary to experience what does not exist, which is a connection between mind and matter, thought and the phenomenal world, through intuition. Architecture, like the phenomenal world, is only possible because of thought, and the alienation of thought from itself in consciousness, a theme elaborated by Hegel.

Cognition by means of conceptions in reason is labeled “philosophical cognition” by Kant, based in a priori intuition (corresponding to *nous poietikos* in Aristotelian philosophy), in contrast to cognition by means of the construction of conceptions, which is “mathematical cognition” in discursive reason (corresponding to *nous pathetikos*). The construction of the conception in discursive reason requires the representation provided by the a priori intuition. This requires a non-empirical intuition, or an idea not connected to sensible reality, in transcendental idealism. A constructed conception or representation, such as architecture, for example, “must be seen to be universally valid for all the possible intuitions which rank under that conception” (400), in the synthesis of the manifold in intuition and apperception. A triangle is constructed, for example, by imagination, in intuition or empirically, without reference to empirical experience, but based in the a priori synthesis. The components of the triangle, the length of the sides, etc., are irrelevant to the conception of the triangle as it exists as an a priori intuition. In the same way, the particular architectural forms in a building are irrelevant to the conception of architecture as an ordering principle of space and time in a priori intuition. The contradiction between the form and the function in the architecture makes this apparent.

Philosophical cognition apprehends the particular by way of the universal, working from a priori intuition to empirical experience, while mathematical cognition apprehends the universal by way of the particular, working from empirical experience to a priori intuition. As the design of a building entails mathematical cognition, the phenomenal elements (representations) of empirical experience are organized toward a “universal condition of construction,” the a priori synthesis. As the apprehension of architecture entails philosophical cognition, transcendental concepts in the universal condition are organized toward the particulars of the construction of a building. Mathematical principles and demonstrations are derived from the construction of conceptions in discursive reason, rather than the conceptions of intuition, from the particular to the universal. Mathematics, thus architecture, entails a construction of symbols (representations), which are represented in intuition as signs (concepts), like signifiers in a language. Intuition operates according to the rules of language; as Lacan concluded that the unconscious is structured like a language, it can be concluded that Kantian intuition is structured like a language.

### Hegel

Architecture is seen as a limited form of artistic expression, in the necessity of its material function, in the *Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics* of Hegel. The “material of architecture is matter itself in its immediate externality as a heavy mass subject to mechanical laws” (CIX),<sup>13</sup> and its forms are “merely set in order in conformity with relations of the abstract understanding” in mathematics and geometry. The forms of architecture can only be inorganic in relation to human reason, as the cultural forms of Casirer and Lacan can only be inorganic. The Idea, the transcendent or spiritual, can only exist in architecture as an abstraction in the symbolic, through the mechanisms of language, or the syntax of architectural language. Architecture can thus only be a symbolic form of art, a representation to human reason of its inability to know the object of phenomena in their essence, in Kantian terms, or to know its unconscious sources, in Lacanian terms.

The beauty of art is beauty that is born “of the mind” (I, II), and because the mind is “higher” than the appearances of nature, in that the mind determines the appearances of nature, the beauty of art is higher than the beauty of nature, according to Hegel. The contradiction between mind and nature necessitates the contradiction between form and function. Beauty is defined as that which reinforces the understanding of mind. Beauty in architecture is that which reinforces the ordering of the sensible world by reason, and that which suggests the transcendent, the other than the material. Mind “comprehends in itself all that is” (I, III), so nature and its manifestations must be secondary. Beauty in nature is only a reflection of the beauty in mind, as the forms perceived in nature are made possible by mind. Beauty in architecture is likewise a reflection of beauty in mind. Beauty in nature, as in architecture, is imperfect and incomplete as a shadow of beauty in mind. Nature and architecture can only exist as completion in mind. Without apperception, the synthesis of the manifold, in Kantian terms, the disparate forms of the material world are fragmentary and incomplete. Because the forms of art are imperfect and incomplete in relation to mind, and because they cannot contain the beauty of the synthesis of the manifold, art achieves beauty by deception in appearance, as does nature.

Mind is able to overcome the limitations of perception in relation to the phenomenal world, which is “erected as a beyond over against immediate consciousness and present sensation” (I, XIII); there is a schism or contradiction between mind and matter which mind is able to heal by investing ideas into sensuous forms in art. The work of art is the “middle term of reconciliation between pure thought and what is external, sensuous, and transitory, between nature with its finite actuality and the infinite freedom of reason that comprehends.” Art is the mediation between mind and nature, between the ideal and the sensuous, as architecture is the mediation between mind and nature through geometry. While the forms of both art and nature are a deceptive semblance in relation to mind, the deceptive forms of art can lead to what is beyond them, the transcendent or metaphysical, the idea in relation to the form, in a way that the forms of nature cannot. Art and architecture are a pure creation of mind disjoined from sensory experience. In nature, form follows function, because the forms of nature are the product of the understanding in reason in relation to the necessity of cause and effect, and in relation to sensory experience.

The work of art or architecture is experienced as both sensuous object and idea communicated to mind. The form in nature is experienced only as sensuous object, though it cannot be known in itself in sensuous apprehension, but only as a representation given to understanding in mind. The representation of the form of the object in nature is nevertheless true to the object in sensual experience, while the representation of the form in art and architecture is false in relation to the sensual experience of the art or architecture, in the contradiction between form and function. While nature exists independently of the perception of it by human sensation and reason, art and architecture do not. Art and architecture only exist for the human mind, as cultural artifacts in the terms of Cassirer. The sensuous only exists in a work of art as a semblance or surface, as a representation. Architecture cannot provide sensuous experience—it can organize space through geometry and mathematics, and the space which is a product of its organization can provide a sensuous experience. The form of the architecture in its geometrical organization does not correspond with the function of the architecture in the space which is the product.

The semblance of the sensuous in art and architecture is a higher form of the immediate sensuous as perceived in nature in that the semblance of the sensuous can act as a mediator between the immediate sensuous and thought, which determines the form of the sensuous. The semblance of the sensuous is mere appearance, form in contradiction to the sensuous object. Art thus produces “no more than a shadow-world of shapes” (LVIII), in the form of a schema, an organization which is a product of reason, in geometry and mathematics for example. But the schematic forms of the semblance of the sensuous in appearance in art “present themselves, not simply for their own sake and for that of their immediate structure, but with the purpose of affording in that shape satisfaction to higher spiritual interests ...”. All art is metaphysical, and all architecture as art is metaphysical. The spiritual or transcendent is infused in sensuous shape, as it communicates to mind, in contradiction to the immediate structure. The idea infuses beauty into the sensuous shape in art; the universal is infused into the particular, to achieve a form of absolute.

### Conclusion

It can be seen that philosophical idealism plays a key role in the psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan, and in an understanding of architecture. The legacy of Berkeley, Kant, Hegel and Cassirer should be taken into consideration for an understanding of the thought of Lacan. The human subject is defined as a product of symbolization, signification, and representation, which removes the subject from nature and the organic, from which it came. Symbolic forms, cultural artifacts and forms of expression; language, signification and representation; apprehension, apperception, intuition, conceptualization; mathematics and geometry; space and time—these are the building blocks of the human subject as it emerges from language. Architecture, incorporating all of these elements, can be seen as a schematic diagram for the construction of the human subject.

<sup>1</sup> Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, Volume 1: *Language*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955).

<sup>2</sup> Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, Volume 3: *The Phenomenology of Knowledge*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957).

<sup>3</sup> Jacques Lacan, *Écrits: A Selection*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York and London: W. W. Norton and Company, 1977 [1966]).

<sup>4</sup> Jacques Lacan, *Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981 [1973]).

<sup>5</sup> Jacques Lacan, *Écrits* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966), quoted in Peter Dews, *Logics of Disintegration: Post-Structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory* (London: Verso, 1987), p. 82.

<sup>6</sup> Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II: The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis 1954–1955*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Sylvana Tomaselli (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991).

<sup>7</sup> George Berkeley, *Works on Vision*, ed. C. M. Turbayne (New York: The Library of Liberal Arts, 1963).

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1990 [1781]).

<sup>10</sup> René Descartes, *Discourse on Method and Related Writings*, trans. D. Clarke (New York: Penguin Books, 2003).

<sup>11</sup> George Berkeley, *Works on Vision*.

<sup>12</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*.

<sup>13</sup> George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics (The Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Art, 1886)*, ed. M. Inwood, trans. B. Bosanquet (London: Penguin Books, 1993).