



## Psychosis and the ineffable space of modernism

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To cite this article: Lorens Eyan Holm (2013) Psychosis and the ineffable space of modernism, The Journal of Architecture, 18:3, 402-424, DOI: [10.1080/13602365.2013.808684](https://doi.org/10.1080/13602365.2013.808684)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13602365.2013.808684>



Published online: 24 Jun 2013.



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# Psychosis and the ineffable space of modernism


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The aim of this psychoanalytic reflection on architecture is to reclaim for space its symbolic and contingent status. It returns to Le Corbusier's concept of ineffable space, a radiant space of explosive energy, in order to link it to the psychoanalytic concept of psychosis. In psychosis, the subject is decoupled from its reality because a key component of the subject's symbolic framework—what Jacques Lacan calls the master signifier—is foreclosed to it. It is not repressed and hence unconscious, it simply does not exist for the subject. This paper outlines the theory of psychosis in psychoanalysis and argues that perspective, in which space seems always already organised for the viewer, is such a symbolic frame. Le Corbusier's vision of ineffable space is a vision of space in which this frame is foreclosed to its subject, the viewer. In its absence, the subject finds itself detached in a dynamic fluidity that elides the familiar spatial territories of inside/outside, near/far...

In the literature of philosophy, cultural criticism and the social sciences, psychosis is regarded as a subjective position within the social-cultural field. This paper extends this use of psychosis to space; it concludes by situating architecture within this broader disciplinary context.

Figure 1. a, Moritz Schreber, *Medical Indoor Gymnastics* (1855); b, Le Corbusier, untitled drawing in *New World of Space* (1948); c, Brook Taylor's 'Principle of linear perspective' (1719).



Begin the narrative arc of a paper with a frontispiece... Corrective braces, invented by Moritz Schreber, the father of psychoanalysis' most celebrated psychotic, may be taken as the image of authority exteriorised + the line drawing that Le Corbusier published of an unsayable space, delineating an object-space without closure + Brook Taylor's diagram for the perplexing space that vision makes.

Then a boundless depth opens up, effaces the walls, drives away contingent presences, *accomplishes the miracle of ineffable space*.

Le Corbusier, *New World of Space* (1948), p.8 [his italics].

This tells you to what extent one must avoid the illusion that language is modelled on a simple and direct apprehension of the real.

Jacques Lacan, *The Psychoses* (1956–57), pp.117–8.

### Introduction

If you want to contemplate an 'other' relationship to reality, you could do worse than look at psychosis. The invisibility of space and the psyche are two of the most salient features of reality. It is because

they are invisible, that we are able to position ourselves in the world.

This paper is about Le Corbusier's concept of ineffable space, which he put forward in the introduction of his book, *New World of Space* (1948).<sup>1</sup> Ineffable space is a refusal of the perspective model for space, and its transparent image, which marks a break with subjectivity as we usually construct it. Ineffable space has the unique characteristic that it does not position the viewing subject before a view. Despite the fact that architecture is the spatial art, architecture rarely questions the transparency of the perspectival image or the invisibility of space, or puts forward a space that wasn't. If space were not invisible, then nothing would have an appearance. When Sigfried Giedion defines the three space




Figure 2. a, cover of Le Corbusier, *New World of Space* (1948); b, photograph by Samuel Bourne, 'Poplar Avenue, Srinigar, Kashmir' (1866).

Coulisse space.

conceptions—the Archaic, Classic and Modern—that organise architectural and psychical history, he assumes they are all equally transparent to vision and motion.<sup>2</sup> When Panofsky and Gombrich debate whether perspective is a symbolic form or the natural state of vision (they are both right, an example of Venturi's both/and), they take the transparency of the spatial image for granted.<sup>3</sup> In their seminal paper on transparency, Rowe and Slutzky suggest that transparency—in particular the phenomenal transparency in the work of Leger, Juan Gris and Le Corbusier—is one of the hallmarks of modernism.<sup>4</sup> I shall argue that space and the subject are bound to each other to constitute what we usually call reality; and I shall speculate about the possibility of unbinding them.

The entanglements of space and subjectivity—in other words, the relationship between how we symbolise our world and our selves—is the central interest of this paper. It is part of a larger project to understand the three clinical structures of psychosis, neurosis and perversion as possible subject positions in space.

### The ineffable—Le Corbusier

First some quotations. 'Ineffable space' opens with a statement about our fundamental spatiality:

Taking possession of space is the first gesture of living things, of men and of animals, of plants and of clouds... The occupation of space is the first proof of existence ... endowed with the sense of space, a faculty which psycho-technical methods seek to reveal ... an incessant desire to take possession of space...<sup>5</sup>

*Possession*—Space is in me; a kind of incorporation; a kind of desire.

*Occupation*—I am in space. Usually, it is a matter of position.

*Psycho-technical*—space is understood through a hybrid psychoanalytic/material analysis, it has the precision of technology, a whiff of the pyro-technical.

Le Corbusier may be in this space, but it is easier to claim that this space is in him. If he is in it, he is in it without position.

Le Corbusier's ineffable space is a radiant space of pure explosive energy, derived from his traumatic first encounter with the Parthenon:

Action Of The Work (architecture, statue, or picture) on its surroundings: vibrations, cries or shouts (such as originate from the Parthenon on the Acropolis in Athens), arrows darting away like rays, as if springing from an explosion; the near or distant site is shaken by them, touched, wounded, dominated or caressed.<sup>6</sup>

*Action of the work*—a dynamic relation to its surroundings.

*Vibrations, cries, shouts*—an enigmatic ventriloquism. Space is an organ. Imagine the mouth-space of Samuel Beckett: whose words have a kinetic efficacy.

*Arrows, darts, rays*—like the Word of God, St Teresa in ecstasy.

*Explosion*—like Ronchamp.

*Touched, wounded, dominated, caressed*—something Oedipal.

Readers of Le Corbusier will recognise the interjectorial style and idiosyncratic language that arcs back to his account of the Parthenon. He is picking up where *Towards an Architecture* (1923) left off. In




Figure 3. a, b; two stills from Samuel Beckett's *Not I*, performed by Billie Whitelaw (1973).

Mouth space and subject position = the space from which the subject speaks.

'Regulating lines' he wrote '...rhythms apparent to the eye... resound in man by an organic inevitability.' In 'Pure creation of the spirit', the chapter about the Parthenon, 'This sounding-board which vibrates in us is our criterion of harmony. This is indeed the axis on which man is organised in perfect accord with nature and... the universe,...'. And 'If we are brought short by the Parthenon, it is because a chord inside us is struck...; the axis is touched.'<sup>7</sup>

Le Corbusier scholars have interpreted his preoccupation with ineffable space as an attempt to synthesise the arts, and ineffable space as the emergent property of such a synthesis. In *Le Corbusier and the continual revolution in architecture* (2000), Charles Jencks says that the paper on ineffable space 'shows how he was beginning to translate his... Ubu painting and sculpture into architecture' and interprets the forms of Ronchamp and Sainte-Baume as metaphors for 'acoustic dishes, or parabolic reflectors, listening to each other'.<sup>8</sup>

In *Le Corbusier: Homme de Lettres* (2011), M. Christine Boyer writes 'By the mid 1930's, Le Cor-

busier was well on his way toward a synthesis of the arts, expressed in his writings as a theory of "ineffable space" (*espace indicible*)'. She points to a key paper he published in 1936 called '*Sainte Alliance des Arts majeurs ou le Grand Art en Gésine*' ('Holy Alliance of the major Arts or the Grand Art coming into Being'). This is Boyer quoting the paper and her comment:

'The work of art is a conscience which opens its door on something that is not in the house, but in its own landscape externalising itself in all directions outside of architecture, profound, to the faraway.' In other words, the work of architecture, as a formal expression, always provides a lyrical escape.<sup>9</sup>

*Homme de Lettres* ends with a section called 'Ineffable Space' as if ineffable space represented a kind of end point that was also a return to origins, a lyrical escape and return, the completion of a life that we all hope for. 'In one sweep of the hand, Le Corbusier reaches backward and forward, drawing a line of continuity from his first Purist paintings to the sculptural garden on the roof of

the *Unités*..., from the lessons of Athens to those of Paris.<sup>10</sup>

Roberto Gargiani and Anna Rosellini seem to get closer to the kinetic truth of the ineffable when they link it to Le Corbusier's contemporaneous chapel at Ronchamp. Ronchamp was ravaged by 'lightening and wars'. Le Corbusier reused the ruins which lay in piles around the site, as if Ronchamp were subject to the ceaseless churning of stones and there was no formal or spatial law that fixed things in their place and unified them.<sup>11</sup> In any case, the familiar themes of synthesis and continuity, the appeal to the lyric, belie an extraordinary detail:

Then a boundless depth opens up, effaces the walls, drives away contingent presences, *accomplishes the miracle of ineffable space*.<sup>12</sup>

*A boundless depth*—it resists representation.

*Contingent presences*—the appearances of things; like you, the reader.

*The miracle*—the whiff of divine intervention.

*Ineffable*—that which is unsayable (*indicible*) we must pass over in silence (*ineffable*).

We can ask what sort of space this is, this space that is boundless and ineffable. I would like to take Le Corbusier at his word, treat this statement literally (not phenomenally) because in matters of space, I am a realist. And here we come up against a problem.

### **The ineffable—what it is not**

It is easier to understand what the ineffable is not, than what it is. Let us put it in relation to its 'other': depth bound by the vanishing point. A boundless depth would be a space unbounded by

the vanishing point that terminates every view. Every *enfilade*, *coulisse*, railway track, or Haussmanian boulevard appeals to this point, but it is implied by the view of anything, including landscape and field space, including the most nomadic mat-building flow-space by Archizoom.

Space not bound by the vanishing point would not calibrate distance, or at least not calibrate it by size, and not calibrate it from a viewer. Walls would no longer appear to converge as they recede from the viewer. Things may still look farther way—Le Corbusier has not eschewed depth, only depth bound—but they achieve that look without getting smaller. We can assume that in the absence of the vanishing point, other attributes of space are absent as well. Objects would no longer occlude each other, for in order to overlap, they have to be seen from a point of view. Everything would be equally present, which implies a kind of instantaneity. Le Corbusier may be in this space, but it is more likely that it is in him. He is either, paradoxically, *nowhere* in this space, or else he is everywhere in it, distributed across its glittering surface, the way the dreamer is distributed across the surface of a dream. As hallucinogenic as this may seem, it is closer to reality, for walls do not really converge and objects do not really get smaller as they get farther away from us. Space is not really organised for the viewer or her/his desire, not for me not for you. And it really is full of energy and motion. If a boundless depth is less illusory than a bounded one, perspective seems to turn us toward and away from reality in a single gesture.<sup>13</sup>

Apparently, Le Corbusier was not altogether happy with the translation of *indicible* as ineffable.<sup>14</sup> *Indicible* can be translated as *unsayable* (French also




Figure 4. a, Bernini, *The Ecstasy of St. Theresa* (1652), photograph by Napoleon Vier (2007); b, Brook Taylor's 'Principle of linear perspective' (1719).

Arrow space, like ecstasy. View space, like desire.

has *ineffable*, he could have used *ineffable* if that was what he wanted). In *Larousse*, the definitions are almost identical but the implications diverge. *Indicible* is cognate to *dire*, 'to say'; to say is to conserve meaning. *Ineffable*, is etymologically related to the Latin for *parler*, 'to speak'; to speak relates to the physical act.<sup>15</sup> If the opposite of speak is silence, the opposite of say, the unsayable, is a meaning—my meaning—that escapes me and cannot be communicated to others. *Indicible* shares the same root as *index* (the footprint is an index of the foot). An indexical space would be a direct imprint upon the surface of the subject, with no mediating language to put it in an economy with others. An un-mediated real: this real space is not mediated by a meaning that I can say to myself or to others, no matter how much I speak. About Ronchamp, Le Corbusier

writes 'I wished to create a place of silence...';<sup>16</sup> and we can assume that in his paper *l'espace indicible*, he was after something else.

### Perspective

At this point we need to explain perspective. In Brook Taylor's diagram from *New Principles of Linear Perspective* (1719/1811), a man views an object; it could be an altar at the end of a nave. Perspective is a projective technique for producing images. It draws a geometric relationship between three things: a viewer standing at an eye point, an expanding view (what, in *Della Pittura* (1436), Alberti called the *pyramid of vision*) and a transparent picture plane upon which the image of the view is projected. The projective geometry links the viewer to its image of a view, and defines the trans-

parency of the image. In the image so produced, the object appears smaller, the surfaces receding from the eye point appear to converge on the vanishing point. The vanishing point is always opposite the eye; at the point of intersection of the line of sight and the picture plane.<sup>17</sup>

I stand in the nave—that Renaissance paradigm of space—viewing the altar and contemplating my proximity to salvation. We usually draw a perspective to construct a view to something we desire, and desire is a waiting game. The view has the *from me/here to you/there* semblance of a path that confers an implied temporality on space and desire, and that inscribes subjectivity into space the way it is inscribed in the subject-object form of language. If perspective allows us to regulate our relationships to our objects, it also allows us to share our views. You cannot have my images, but you can come to my position and see what I see, or else I can snap a photograph or sketch a picture and show you my view. We share views in the same sense that we share sayable meanings, because there is a public language (of words, of pictures) for conveying it. In this sense, perspective is an agreement with others, and the objectivity of space is a kind of infinitely cross-checkable inter-subjectivity made possible by perspective. Perspective turns us away from reality but it does so in the service of something more important for consciousness; it allows us to construct an 'other' reality whose most significant aspect is that in it, desire is shareable. Perspective space is no realer than unsayable space, it is simply more sharable. For all these reasons, we are signed up members of the perspective club, without which spatial discourse would

be impossible. It has the compulsory force of language.

Unsayable space is an explosion into a new form of space and subjectivity. We momentarily glimpse freedom from a space that confines us to views and positions, all manner of gluey subjective entanglements. It is too simple to say it is an integration of the arts because that assumes that it is about art and not what Le Corbusier said it was about, which is space. We are less interested in *why* it was proposed, than in what it *does*. By placing the subject into a view, perspective seems to be the formula for normal space, or at least the normally neurotic space of subject positions. Space surrounds me in a cosy container so that I can imagine walking down the nave to what I desire, and then tell you about it. Le Corbusier's ineffable is not about something added to make a better space (more energy); nor is it a simple displacement (a voyage to somewhere exotic, like Le Corbusier's voyage to the orient). It is more like the same space, from which something has been removed. But it is not like the simple removal of an altar from a nave, which leaves the nave and the viewer intact (we could substitute another object). Something is unbound. Whatever it is that binds me to space, seems no longer to operate. Whatever it is that binds me to me, seems no longer to operate. The exotic voyage quickly becomes old hat, but this same space, threatens never to contain me.

### Psychosis

About the only other place in which we encounter such a radical repositioning of our relationship to reality is in psychosis. The central narrative in the



psychoanalytic discourse of psychosis is the case of Daniel Paul Schreber, a distinguished German lawyer whose crisis began when he was appointed to the high court. It was exacerbated by being unable to have children. He was convinced he was the only remaining man in a world of depleted grey men. He was tormented by divine rays that effeminised his body and interrupted his thoughts, so that he could repopulate the world with God's children. His father was a disciplinarian whose correction regime extended to body braces. The overriding architectural image in Schreber's *Memoirs of my Nervous Illness* (1903) is of a rain-lashed Schreber howling into the storm, closing windows, slamming shutters, drawing curtains, turning off lights. No number of architectural layers succeeds in keeping God's rays out, and Schreber in. Psychosis—or at least the delusions associated with psychosis—is a particular form of architectural disorder. In this vignette, architecture fails to draw the line between inside and outside, to regulate the border crossing, to maintain the container.<sup>18</sup>

Psychosis involves a disintegration of the self; and the highly structured delusions of the psychotic are an attempt to erect a defensive outside against this crumbling centre. Psychotics hear voices. They sometimes see things. They invent words. In the paper 'Neurosis and Psychosis' (1923), Freud writes:

...neurosis is the result of a conflict between the ego and its id, whereas psychosis is the analogous outcome of a similar disturbance in the relations between the ego and the external world ... In regard to the genesis of delusions, a fair number of analyses have taught us that the delusion is found applied like a patch over the place where

originally a rent had appeared in the ego's relation to the external world.<sup>19</sup>

The delusions of the psychotic are like a patch placed on a rent in the subject's relation to reality. Psychotics attempt to repair the world with a new patch of their own making. It is a creative act. In *The Psychoses* (1955–1956), Jacques Lacan asks, to what kind of relationship between subject and world could Freud be referring. His answer, a symbolic relationship, the symbolic world:

... you will see this from the context, it's to a deficiency, to a hole in the symbolic, that [Freud] is referring, even if in the German text it's the term *reality* that is used.<sup>20</sup>

### Master signifier Foreclosure

The symbolic order does not work for psychotics. They hover somewhere between an unmediated reality and fantasy: what Lacan calls the real and the imaginary. The symbolic order comprises the great symbolic or conceptual systems that frame human relationships and make them possible: language, religion, money, law, what the sociologist Durkheim called social facts. It should be clear that perspective—with its capacity to codify space in terms of subject/object-positions, desire and other functions of subjectivity—has to be understood as one such. In Lacan's text, the master signifier is the lynchpin of the symbolic order, and it is the foreclosure of this signifier to the subject that is the structural deficit of psychosis. Foreclosure is Lacan's translation of Freud's *verwerfung* ('disavowal, repudiation' in the *Standard Edition*), 'the mechanism, ... by means of which the ego detaches itself from the external world.'<sup>21</sup>

It is not repressed and hence unconscious, it simply does not exist for the subject. The foreclosure or loss of this signifier leaves a hole in the symbolic order for the subject. 'Psychosis consists of a hole, a lack, at the level of the signifier.'<sup>22</sup>

The master signifier is an uber-signifier that binds the subject to its own discourse and the discourse of others. It marks a position that orients each of us in the symbolic order. In *The Psychoses*, Lacan builds the concept by condensing several terms, including the-name-of-the-father (*le-nom-du-père*), the law, 'the law of the signifier',<sup>23</sup> the symbolic father,<sup>24</sup> 'this fundamental signifier called *being a father*,<sup>25</sup> the primordial signifier<sup>26</sup> instituted by myth 'aimed at installing man... in the world',<sup>27</sup> Freud's dead father that ties us to the Law.<sup>28</sup> Lacan calls the operation by which we assume the name-of-the-father *metaphor*, the *paternal metaphor*, according to which the name-of-the-father replaces the desire of the mother (the child's desire for the mother, the mother's for the child) in the Oedipal scenario.<sup>29</sup> The Lacanian analyst Bruce Fink describes this as overwriting: the symbolic order introduced by the father figure overwrites or reconfigures the intimate relation of mother and child, and binds the child to the social world.<sup>30</sup> The child emerges from the Oedipal complex by assuming the name of the father, in other words, by internalising the capacity to act with his authority and desire in a world of others. The name is important because it indicates the symbolic aspect of this authority, on a par with the *Ten Commandments* or when the police say, *I arrest you in the name of the law*. Symbolic as opposed to real authority (a gun) or imaginary authority (a threat).

Lacan may have developed his thinking on the master signifier by a close reading of Freud's Oedipal complex (to speak with the authority and desire of the father), but its reach extends to the subject's efficacy in language, language which is both the source of its power and the limits of it. In this argument about space, the most important aspect of the master signifier has to do with agency. This is a structural as opposed to semantic function. The master signifier yokes me to my voice the way the perspective apparatus yokes me to my images. It makes my speech mine. Foreclosure involves a catastrophic loss of agency. I lose my voice and hence my power.<sup>31</sup>

The effect of psychotic delusion is to re-construct what should have been an internalised agency, in the external world. We have glimpsed Schreber's disrupted relation to authority, paternal, legal and religious. Typically the psychotic hears voices, and attributes this to others or to the environment. Lacan quips that everyone hears their own voice, it is just that the psychotic cannot tell that it is theirs. The psychotic does not attribute their voice to themselves, not because they mistake it for someone else's, or do not hear very well, but because the relation that binds the subject to its own voice does not exist. The psychotic's delusion is 'a mechanism of imaginary compensation... for the absent Oedipal complex, which would have given him virility in the form, not of the paternal image, but of the [paternal] signifier, *the name of the father*.'<sup>32</sup>

### **Perspective—master signifier**

I have just stated that the master signifier yokes us to our voice the way the vanishing point and picture

plane yoke us to space. The perspective frame organises our visual experience so that we can be effective spatial agents. Although to my mind, the perspective frame is a coherent model for the master signifier, Lacan did not make this claim. I want to argue that the perspective frame functions as the master signifier for space because I want to argue that ineffable space shares with psychosis the structural deficit of foreclosure. Perspective structures our views, and thereby allows us to be

effective spatial agents. The perspective frame, in which space is always already organised for the viewer, is foreclosed to the inhabitant of ineffable space, and in its absence s/he is left with a dynamic fluidity that elides the familiar spatial territories of the view, of inside/outside, near/far, fore- and background.... This is an appeal, not to reason, nor to evidence, but to the understanding.<sup>33</sup>

What conception of space and fluidity is at work here? Space is the field of images (all possible





Figure 5. a, b; Brook Taylor's 'Principle of linear perspective' (1719).

Remove the tablet in two steps.

images of all possible viewers). We don't usually think of space as a field of images, we think of it as space, but space—space itself—like the psyche, is a big fat nothing. If you want to know what space is, close your eyes and stick your tongue out the window. It is not a question of what space is really like, as if we could strip away the layers of paper and get back to bare walls—we are always already papered—but of how others represent space to us, by words, images and buildings; and thereby put it into circulation.

The lesson of psychosis and foreclosure is that experience for the subject is not a simple matter of fact. We do not experience the world simply because we have a body with a sensory surface. It requires an attachment. We have to bind ourselves to our images in an orderly way. We do it with a universally shared conception of space called perspective. Perspective binds images to each other to create coherent spatial discourses, like well-formed plans, and integrated design projects; and it binds subjects to images to construct their spatial experience. It says that experience will have a certain relationship to the subject of experience. Experience will take the form of a flow of views, although it has no claim on the content of those views. Our images have to be joined up and they have to be significant for us. We have to be able to distinguish them from the images of others. We have to have an account of the image that approximates the signifier, the visual signifier.

Psychoanalysis is the study of how language flows through the subject. Freud defined this flow in his work on the free association of words in analysis, matched by the free-floating attention of the analyst. He related it to the condensation and displa-

cement of dream images. Words and images either replace each other or get sticky together. They have a kind of natural affinity which goes on happening even when we are not paying attention. Lacan said time and again *the unconscious is structured like a language* and *the unconscious is the discourse of the Other*. For Freud, we are a conduit for words and images; for Lacan, a signifier machine.<sup>34</sup>

We do not have the space to look at their work on language, but it goes right to the integrity of the subject, for this continuous flow constitutes the principle of continuity of the subject. I am the same subject now as tomorrow. Earlier we described how perspective functioned like a language, to share desire. Perspective space is not a language, but we are here to sketch the idea that space is a flow of signifiers. We are intensely spatial. We take possession of space; we occupy it. So wrote Le Corbusier. As in language, we are awash in space and space flows through us. Lacan coined the term *extimate* (= intimate + exterior) to denote this *in you more than you* relationship.<sup>35</sup>

We can see how this works by reference to Taylor's diagram. As a model for vision (which, in architectural discourse, it purports to be) as opposed to simply an instruction about how to make realistic pictures, perspective depends for its intelligibility upon a series of equivalences. In Taylor's diagram, the object is in three places: in the view, on the tablet, in the eye of the beholder. The image is in two: on the tablet and in the eye of the beholder (note the raised hand). The image is out there in the world and in the eye. My views are in me, but only in the sense that they are attached to me symbolically. It is the same with my voice.<sup>36</sup>



Figure 6. a, Jeff Wall, 'A Sudden Gust of Wind (after Hokusai)' (1993), transparency in lightbox, 229.0 x 377.0; b, Jeremy Deller, 'Exodus of bats at dusk, Frio Caves Texas' (2011).

As if all your signifiers were to become real: your thoughts like papers blowing in the wind... or a flight of bats at sunset.

To make a long story short, did you ever wonder what would happen if you took Taylor's tablet away? I think that is what has happened with ineffable space. What is at stake is nothing short of the intimacy and integrity of the 'I': the I who speaks and the I who sees (all puns intended). It seems easy to remove Taylor's image because it is drawn as if it were a tablet. But it is not clear what would be left. When we take the image out of the context of projection, the image loses its transparency and the subject loses its location, as the single point of reception of experience to which the I refers. Unlike building materials, the transparency of the image is not a material fact, because it is always a question of transparent for whom. My image is transparent for me because it is a projection of my view on the picture plane. Only I see through my tablet to my object; for


others, it is just another photograph. It might still be possible to speak of visual experience, but it is not clear in what sense that experience would be mine. If we return to ineffable space for a moment: Le Corbusier's cries and shouts are announced as if they were concrete facts. In Lacan's terms, what could only be *percepts*, are detached from the *perciens*. Imagine having someone else's images. Or seeing this room from a position elsewhere than where you are.<sup>37</sup>

Imagine if all these signifiers which are not space but images of space and which are, at least in a naive sense, in me, were drawn out of me. As if my spatial experience, which I represent to you as photographs, really were photographs for me too, blowing in the wind. And really had the opacity of photographs. I would have no link to, or control over them, even though they seemed to exhibit

agency. I would begin to disperse, and my images would begin to harden, to thicken, to become real. To replace me in the world. This process of concretisation and exteriorisation of the image, of myself, others might notice it happening to me, but how could I notice it? Lacan has a way to understand this: '...whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of *Verwerfung*, reappears in the real.'<sup>38</sup> When we contemplate the possibility of

decoupling ourselves from space, we realise that space is not a stable pre-existing thing from which we are now cast adrift, but that the perspective couple had no small part in constituting both ourselves and our space. We are faced with the Kantian conundrum of *things-in-themselves*. Ineffable space is perfectly possible, possible in the sense of being conceivable, but if it were to obtain, the I would not be here to see it.<sup>39</sup>

Figure 7. a, Man Ray, '229, boulevard de Raspail' (1930); b, Superstudio, *Citta del Libro* ('city of the book') (1971).



Object becomes surface, surface becomes real. Depth becomes symbol, symbol becomes real.

### Conclusion...

The aim of this psychoanalytic reflection on architecture has been to disengage the spatial image from space, and thereby to reclaim for perspective its symbolic and contingent status. Space for the subject is the flow of signifiers to which we are yoked by the perspective apparatus. Whatever is real about space—the remainder of emptiness and energy—is for better or worse beyond our experience, not because it is impossible, but because the foreclosure of this symbolic yoke makes the *I* impossible. To this extent our subjectivity is a perspectival subjectivity, and it is reflected in architecture.

We usually regard space as a given (by definition we are in it), but the experience of Le Corbusier in which perspective seems not to be the law, raises the spectre that space and the subject are contingent and symbolic. It/we could have been otherwise. If there is an aspect of space which is given, it is its nothingness. All else—its structure and qualities—is constituted by us through practices like architecture. There may be other forms of space than the perspective form and, coincident with them, other spatial subjectivities, but they will be no less created by ourselves through our architectural practices.

Although we attribute to perspective our spatial agency, our authority, rarely does anyone say 'in the name of perspective, put that object in its place, make it appear smaller', still less, 'in the name of Brunelleschi, see what I see'.<sup>40</sup> That perspective functions as the signifier for a particular form of space, I hope is clear. That we should attribute master status to it, acknowledges its capacity to structure space and subject for each other, a

structure in which architecture has heavily invested. The compulsory nature of space (we cannot choose to ignore it) lies not in its affinity to objectivities like optics, but to its constitutive role in forming the self. The *I* is overwritten by perspective (the spatial metaphor?), without which I could not localise itself, I could not distinguish itself from space, from other I's, from objects.

This paper has not attempted to describe Le Corbusier's unsayable space (any description would be a falsification) or to trace its lineage (purist painting, the free plan, the radiant city, the radiant farm). Unsayable space is not simply an 'other' space type, but a break with subjectivity as we know it, and hence with spatial discourse and the anticipated space of modernism. If we extend this conclusion by looking again at breaks, broken spaces and subjects distributed across the outlandish fantasy of the signifier unyoked, exteriorised, concrete... it is to pursue for the reader something of this vertiginous theoretical *otherwise* for subjectivity and architecture raised by the perplexing condition of an unspeakable/unsayable space.

### ...radical break

Modernism has been defined by breaks and subsequent re-continuities that it has had to negotiate with its pasts. What is so radical about a boundless depth is not that it suggests an alternative image of space, a new style perhaps, but that it decouples spatial experience from the subject. Ineffable space marks a break with reality more absolute than any stylistic or ideological change based on new materials and technologies, conquests and revolutions. It is

clearly an unrealised break. It is hard to imagine such a break ever being more than a brief eruption, a glimpse. A break depends for its intelligibility upon the continuity of an attendant subject, and it is this continuity that is called into question. This is perhaps the aspiration—let us call it the modernist gesture—that defines modernism and gives it its hard edge. It will go on happening, because it can never succeed.

The paper sheds light on the observation that the twentieth century falls under the sign of psychosis. Georg Simmel, Al Alvarez, Rem Koolhaas, Deleuze + Guattari and other authors point, not simply to the violence of the twentieth century, its oneiric extremism, its delusional politics, its problematic disengagements with the past, its over-valuation of the new, the rise of the machine which is a signifier for both psychosis and modernity... but also to an inner disintegration that seems part and parcel of the creative process of twentieth-century thought and action.<sup>41</sup> This paper has been able to make these general observations precise for architecture by delineating the mechanism of this disintegration in foreclosure; in the particular case of Le Corbusier, the foreclosure of the perspective model for space and subjectivity, which may go some way towards explaining the enduring relevance of Le Corbusier in contemporary thought. I do not claim that Le Corbusier was psychotic (although Rem Koolhaas did), but among all of the architectural inventions that were his legacy to the twentieth century, one of them was to reject the bounds of perspective for a new form of concrete and exterior subjectivity, a trajectory, that can never be fully realised as space because it can never be fully realised as subjectivity.<sup>42</sup>

### ...resistance

Psychosis is treated in this paper, not as a coagulation of personality traits requiring expurgation, such as might be found in a checklist of psychotic phenomena, but as a structure with a precision worthy of architecture. This approach follows the psychoanalytic discourse of Freud and Lacan, for which psychosis is not simply an illness but a structure that opens up new possibilities for understanding the subject and its world. Psychosis has an ambivalent place in the cultural imaginary. It is associated with creativity as well as a catastrophic loss of agency. The psychotic is for Deleuze + Guattari (a doubled author, a split authority), the great figure of creativity in the fluid world of twentieth-century capital. They dismiss the Oedipal complex as an absurdity of Victorian Viennese conservative family values, but they maintain the figure of the psychotic as the action hero and creative agent of capitalist society and the desiring machine as a key metaphor for subjectivity. In the terms of Deleuze + Guattari, the master signifier is a no-trespassing sign that compartmentalises the world into discrete territories, and its foreclosure a form of creative de-territorialisation, that shakes things up, allows new forms of thought, action and freedom.<sup>43</sup>

How would this action hero respond to a spatial authority so excessive, there is no signifier adequate to it?<sup>44</sup> A full-blown psychosis may be the best response to environments of total control where agency has been shifted not simply to others but to machines or to environments which, to us, are in effect machines, because we can only ever hope to be cogs in them. You relinquish authority to survive.






Figure 8. a, Richard Lindner, 'Boy with machine' (1954); b, Ron Herron & Archigram, 'Walking City' (1964).

Deleuze + Guattari's machinic body (the frontispiece to *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*) and Archigram's machinic environment, where agency and desire are displaced, to an outside or to an inside that is really an outside. What should have been symbolic is made real.

This is a twentieth-century spectre. Eisenhower called it the *military-industrial complex*. Colin Rowe and Fred Koetter called it the city of total control. Lewis Mumford, that theorist of cities and technology, called these environments—marked by an irresistible confluence of social, political, military and ideological control—the mega-machine. Although this machine is of our own making, it operates with its own values and priorities that seem to reflect no one's, not even the leader impaled at its apex.<sup>45</sup>

The mega-machine is perhaps most virulent when power and agency are brought together with space. If we return to the proposition with which we began,

that the invisibility of space and the psyche are necessary conditions for reflecting upon ourselves and our objects, we can see how a psychotic approach might resist regimes of pervasive surveillance and control. These regimes use an excessive visibility to threaten our sense of intimacy. Typically, they are figured in architecture by the Panopticon. They go to the heart of subjectivity because they are about positioning and visibility, and the consequent reformation of the intimate inside. If you fashion yourself a psychotic, no one will watch you. It is not that you are too weird, it is that your signifiers are bad. *Cries, shouts, vibrations*. They may

look like signifiers but they don't seem to be yours or mine or anyone's. This approach is the last stand of the psyche against an unremitting materialism. We exteriorise the signifier because we have lost control of ourselves in the material world.

Faced with the threat of an aggressive visibility, we can either guard our intimacy by retreating into more invisibility, which is like hiding, we would eventually be found; or we can become more visible, we can forsake our intimacy by refusing the perspective couple that sponsors it. We conceal our desire by diverting the flow of signifiers (neurosis) or we concretise it in the world (psychosis). Remember the image of Taylor's tablet cut loose and detached. The psychotic puts his desire out there in the world in a way that is absolutely real for him, but means nothing to others. We would experience our own visibility like others do, but conversely, our visibility to others would signify nothing. It would mark the end of vision, not because, in some anatomical sense authority became blind, but because seeing others would be drained of its significance. If I am no longer seen by others to be a single point of agency and desire (hence a potential criminal), there would be no reason to survey me. The surveyor will see my image, but no longer regard it as an 'other' /.

We can see just what a grotesque betrayal of subjectivity is involved in aggressive and pervasive regimes of surveillance (architecture + cameras). As a perspectival subject, I am first invisible to myself (always behind my view never in it), but visible to others. In Taylor's diagram, the subject is an invisible point of projection for itself and an image on a screen for others. My sense of my own invisibility—correlate to my intimacy to myself—is the flip side

of my visibility to others. My visibility, this essential aspect of my subjectivity, is in the hands of others. It is a precious agreement between each of us and others. It is intimate and public.<sup>46</sup> It is not for nothing that space is the field of the 'Other'. Architecture is shared not because it is jointly owned but because it is spatial. We noted earlier that perspective allows us to share spatial experience. We now see that the inter-subjective aspect of perspective extends to our visibility. A panoptic regime is foisted upon us by a symbolic father (our government, an institution, a multi-national) in the name of security. These aims are always poorly defined but well supported by statistics. We acquiesce. We have no choice because although this regime is of our own making, it is bigger than us. What has been missed in this approach is that if there is a greater good, it is not security. It is to support, not abuse, the conditions that allow subjectivity to happen. In the face of this betrayal, all we can do is respond by finding new forms of subjectivity and visibility that do not go through other subjects.

### **...man the artefact**

Psychosis is a radical rethink of man the artefact. We can ask, how do we go on working on ourselves. How can we remake ourselves as machines, or how do we humanise these machines we are becoming. The psychotic is able to make great leaps precisely because s/he is unable or unwilling to use the conceptual frameworks that bind us to our selves, to our objects of desire, to others, to space.

The machine aesthetic notwithstanding, I have no examples of the psychotic's gambit in architecture. We would expect new subjectivities to be

formed in new environments. Such an environment is probably here but hiding in plain sight. It would be the antithesis of the joined-up urbanism we celebrate. It would be associated with an excessive individualism that, like Schreber, knows of no others. It might involve a knowing deterioration of the built environment coupled with a technical mastery in the erection of a shiny brave new one (symbolic disintegration, new reality). In either case, we would expect something whose significance was not recognisable to architecture and its regulatory regimes (RIBA, ARB, Building Regulations, Highways Act, Town & Country Planning, Planning Advice Notes...). I would not find *I* in it. The nearest *I* get is literature. With a technical mastery that is almost dizzying, Beckett has a way of distributing *I* across the surface of his text. Text remains, but its functions—continuity of reference, an advancing plot—begin to disintegrate. It is a subterfuge. He knows that if he does that, the people who get pleasure out of surveillance will not read him.<sup>47</sup>

### ...jouissance

Le Corbusier momentarily escaped to a new space and we glimpsed his excessive joy. Every new work of architecture is a shuddering and proliferous encounter with the other works that constitute its incomplete corpus. We can ask of any architecture, statue or picture, this text even, wherein lies the voice, power and enjoyment of its author in this encounter. Where in your house do you house your enjoyment? We follow the lead of Le Corbusier and speculate about an unsayable space for spatial enjoyment, an enjoyment beyond desire and its objects, or

A desire beyond the symbol, or  
A desire stripped of its neuroses, or  
A desire fully realised, realised with no displacement,  
no deferring, no spatialising or temporising...

and although for the most part we go on *not* acknowledging it, trying, in other words, to domestify and gentlify snapshots like Le Corbusier's vision of ineffable space, it is perhaps the affinity between the possibility for this real enjoyment in psychosis and twentieth-century culture generally, that explains the overwhelming impact and reception of Le Corbusier's work in the twentieth century.

### Image credits and sources

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1b, Le Corbusier, untitled line drawing appearing on p. 9 of *New World of Space* (New York, Reynal & Hitchcock, 1948), courtesy of Fondation Le Corbusier and DACS, © FLC/ADAGP, Paris and DACS, London, 2013.

1c, 'Principle of linear perspective', in, Brook Taylor, *New principles of linear perspective, or the art of designing on a plane the representations of all sorts of objects, in a more general and simple method than has been done before* (London, 1719), plate p. 90. This edition, in the public domain, was accessed 31/12/12 from the website of European Cultural Heritage Online (ECHO): an Open Access Infrastructure to bring Essential Cultural Heritage Online, at <http://echo.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/ECHOdocuView?url=/permanent/library/C2PG4QN1/pageimg&start=81&viewMode=images&mode=imagepath&pn=90>

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Figure 5a, b, two montages by the Author, incorporating Brook Taylor's 'Principle of linear perspective', Figure 1c above.

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## Notes and references

1. Le Corbusier, *New World of Space* (Reynal & Hitchcock and the Institute for Contemporary Art; New York and Boston, 1948). Le Corbusier first published this text as an article, 'L'Espace Indicible', in *L'Architecture d'aujourd'hui* (January, 1946), pp. 9–10. He republished it in *Modulor 1* (1950) and *Modulor 2* (1955). *Oeuvre Complète*, Volume 5, refers to a paper called 'L'Espace Indicible' from 1957, that Christine Boyer suggests, in *Le Corbusier, Homme de Lettres*, was never written.
2. See Sigfried Giedion, *The Eternal Present: The beginnings of architecture: a contribution on constancy and change* (London, Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 521–26, for a summary of the three space conceptions, which are introduced in the preface, p. x, and discussed throughout the text. The Archaic space conception is discussed in detail in pp. 502–20. Sigfried Giedion, *Architecture and the Phenomena of Transition: the three space conceptions in architecture* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971) is a picture book that does not expand upon the earlier text.
3. Erwin Panofsky, *Perspective as Symbolic Form* (New York, Zone Books, 1991; first published 1927), esp. pp. 27–31. Ernest H. Gombrich's position is dif-

fused throughout *Art and Illusion: a study in the psychology of pictorial representation* (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1960), but see especially pp. 243–87, 291–93, 330–31. Robert Venturi, *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture* (New York, Museum of Modern Art, 1966), pp. 23–33.

4. Colin Rowe, Robert Slutzky, 'Transparency: Literal and Phenomenal', in *Perspecta* 8 (1963), pp. 45–54; republished in Colin Rowe, *Mathematics of the Ideal Villa and other essays* (Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1976), pp. 159–83.
5. Le Corbusier, *New World of Space*, *op.cit.*: these quotations are from pp. 7 and 9.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
7. Le Corbusier, *Towards A New Architecture* (New York, Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1960), translated from the 1923 French edition by Frederick Etchells: these quotations are from pp.68, 192 and 196 respectively.
8. Charles Jencks, *Le Corbusier and the continual revolution in architecture* (New York, Monacelli Press, 2000), p. 261.
9. M. Christine Boyer, *Le Corbusier: Homme de Lettres* (New York, Princeton, NJ, Princeton Architectural Press, 2011), both quotations from p. 427. Boyer's book is a source book for Le Corbusier's letters and articles. She argues that Le Corbusier is trying to consolidate the figure of the mathematician and the poet. The writings from the mid-1930s leading up to *New World of Space* are marked by the frequent use of the words synthesis, alliance and unity. See also another key archival project, Catherine de Smet, *Le Corbusier: un architecte et ses livres* (Baden, Lars Muller Publishers, 2005).
10. M. C. Boyer, *Le Corbusier*, *op. cit.*, p. 684.
11. Roberto Gargiani, Anna Rosellini, *Le Corbusier: Beton Brut and Ineffable Space (1940–1965): Surface Materials and Psychophysiology of Vision (Essays in Architecture)* (London, Routledge, 2011), pp.128–9.

See also, Le Corbusier, *The Chapel at Ronchamp* (New York, Praeger, 1957), translated from the French by Jacqueline Cullen: *cf.* photograph (p. 91), photomontage (p. 8), and the statement '...it has always endured the outrages of man or the elements: lightning and wars... the latter time and again, during the liberation it was destroyed by artillery fire.' (p. 88). According to Lacan, the psychotic never stops rearranging the objects of his delusion (*The Psychoses*, p. 20).

12. Le Corbusier, *New World of Space*, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
13. Freud described psychosis as a turning away from reality. It seems that, in matters of space, our relationship to reality is defined by the trope of turning and it matters little which sense it has. *Cf.* Sigmund Freud, 'Splitting of the ego in the process of defence' (1940/1938/1937), in *Sigmund Freud, On Metapsychology: the theory of psychoanalysis*, Angela Richards, James Strachey, eds (London, Penguin, 1991), p. 463.
14. R. Gargiani, A. Rosellini, *op.cit.*, pp. 64–5.
15. *Petit Larousse illustré* (Paris, Librairie Larousse, 1973). Both definitions use the same composite verb *pouvoir être exprimer* and both give each other's word as a synonym.
16. Le Corbusier, *The Chapel at Ronchamp*, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
17. Brook Taylor, *New Principles of Linear Perspective* (London, 1719/1811); Leon Battista Alberti, *On Painting (Della Pittura, 1435/36)* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966), trsl. John Spencer.
18. Daniel Paul Schreber, *Memoirs of my nervous illness* (London, Dawson, 1955) translated from the 1903 text in German by Ida Macalpine and Richard A. Hunter.
19. Freud, 'Neurosis and Psychosis', in James Strachey, ed., *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. XIX (1923–25) (London, The Hogarth Press and the Institute of

- Psycho-Analysis), pp. 147–53; the quotations are from pp.149,151.
20. Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses 1955–1956*, trsl. Russell Grigg (New York, Norton, 1993), p. 156.
  21. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
  22. *Ibid.*, p. 201.
  23. *Ibid.*, p. 223. The term ‘name-of-the-father’ is distributed throughout *The Psychoses*. Lacan also uses the terms ‘paternal signifier’ (p. 232) and ‘fundamental signifier’ (p. 198) to similar effect in *Seminar 5: The Formations of the Unconscious 1957–58*, trsl. Cormac Gallagher, published privately online at <http://www.lacaninireland.com>.
  24. J. Lacan, *The Psychoses, op. cit.*, p. 212.
  25. *Ibid.*, p. 293 (Lacan’s italics).
  26. *Ibid.*, pp. 143ff.
  27. *Ibid.*, p. 200.
  28. J. Lacan, ‘On a Question Prior to any Possible Treatment of Psychosis’ (1958), in *Ecrits: the first complete edition in English* (New York, Norton, 2006), trsl. Bruce Fink, pp. 464.
  29. *Ibid.*, pp. 464–65.
  30. Metaphor refers to the function by which one signifier replaces another in the signifying chain, pushing it under the bar of signification into the signified position; hence meaning is symbolised. See Bruce Fink, *A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis: theory and practice* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard UP, 1997), pp. 90–93 for the paternal metaphor; pp. 88–89 for overwriting.
  31. The authority with which I speak is not about mastering a subject matter, but about mastering my voice. This mastery is not only an effect of symbolic attachment, but also of position. According to Lacan, the master signifier positions me in the field of the ‘Other’. My authority to speak cannot be disengaged from the position I hold vis-à-vis others, who grant that authority by agreeing to listen. I stand before you, this man speaking, and we cannot dissociate the man from the speech. I speak in my name because it was the name I took up and internalised from my masters—parental, institutional, legal—and I convey to you something of my own agency and power, which cannot be disentangled from you. This agency and power is collectively held.
  32. J. Lacan, *The Psychoses, op. cit.*, p. 293.
  33. When Lacan developed the idea of the master signifier in the 1950s, he did not mention perspective. He explains it with similes like the highway that ‘bundles’ local roads. See *The Psychoses, op. cit.*, the chapter ‘The highway and the signifier “being a father”’, pp. 285ff. Lacan related perspective to desire in *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis* (New York, Norton, 1981), (*Seminar XI*), but not to my knowledge to the master signifier: see the section ‘Of The Gaze As *objet petit a*’. I discuss this section in Lorens Holm, *Brunelleschi Lacan Le Corbusier: architecture, space, and the construction of subjectivity* (London, Routledge, 2010): the chapters ‘Intercession: a repetition on the gaze and voice of Brunelleschi’ and ‘Desire, position, opacity and death in the visual field’.
  34. Freud discusses free association in his ‘Papers on technique’. He discusses the way words and images form chains that lead back to unconscious fears of death and desire in the *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901) (New York, Norton, 1960). Freud included words and images in this account of the unconscious, for which see ‘The Unconscious’ (1915) in *Sigmund Freud: On Metapsychology: the theory of psychoanalysis* (London, Penguin), pp. 167–222. For a good short account of the dream work (condensation and displacement) see Freud, *On Dreams (1901)* (New York, Norton, 1952). In *The Psychoses, op. cit.*, p. 167, Lacan states that ‘every analytic phenomenon... is

structured like a language'; it 'always presents the duality of the signifier and the signified.' In 'Seminar on "The Purloined Letter"', *Ecrits, op. cit.*, p. 16, 'the unconscious is the Other's discourse'; in *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, op. cit.*, p. 131, 'the unconscious is the discourse of the Other' and pp.149, 203, 'the unconscious is structured like a language.' Compare this to what Christine Boyer says about Le Corbusier, in M. C. Boyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 36–7: 'Le Corbusier developed an early understanding that architecture was a mental structure developed out of language and mathematics—it was not like a language, a commonly used metaphor, but actually structured or modeled in Le Corbusier's mind as a language.'

35. *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959–1960* (New York, Norton, 1992), p. 139, 'intimate exteriority or extimacy'. To say that space is the field of the Other is to equate the spatial image with the signifier, to attribute the image significance; it is not to claim that space is a language: unlike words, images do not have definitions and are not organised in a grammar. For a discussion of the image as a visual signifier, cf. Christian Metz, 'The Imaginary Signifier', *Screen*, Vol. 16, no. 2 (1975), pp. 14–76.
36. In order to extricate himself from an impossibly figurative language, Lacan repositioned the familiar architecture distinction inside/outside to the subjective one symbolic/real. Only in a figurative sense could you say my desire is in me, because desire does not have the logic of position. The crumbling world of the psychotic is not interior, nor is the one s/he builds a new exterior. Closing doors and windows does not work for Schreber. The psychotic's symbolic relationship to her/his world is crumbling. S/he replaces it with a new reality, a new certainty.
37. When Caillois described a spatial form of psychical collapse, he reported patients who claimed to see the space they were in but could not locate themselves in it. Or who felt invaded by space, as if space failed to localise and individuate them. Cf. Roger Caillois, 'Mimicry and Legendary Psychasthenia' (1935), translated and reprinted in *October*, Vol. 31 (1984). Lacan intimated the possibility of the *percept* without a *perciens* in 'On a Question Prior...', in *Ecrits, op. cit.*, p. 446.
38. J. Lacan, *The Psychoses, op. cit.*, p. 13.
39. I have this formulation from the neo-Kantian Peter F. Strawson in *Individuals: an essay in descriptive metaphysics* (Methuen/Doubleday Anchor, New York, 1959/1963). Kant's *things-in-themselves* are things as they exist outside the spatial and temporal logic by which subjects individuate them into objects. Perspective is the paradigm for this logic. Strawson argues that this is not an impossible state of the world, but impossible state for subjects.
40. L. Holm, *Brunelleschi Lacan Le Corbusier, op. cit.*, see p. 142 where I attribute a spatial form of paternal authority to Brunelleschi. See also the two chapters 'Brunelleschi and Le Corbusier: photograph and snapshot' and 'Brunelleschi and Le Corbusier: image and field' where I argue that they mark opposite poles of spatial experience. When Brunelleschi invented perspective, he tightly bound the subject to its space; for the young Jeanneret on the Acropolis, these bounds unravelled.
41. See Georg Simmel, 'The Metropolis and Mental Life' (1903) and Al Alvarez, 'The New Poetry or beyond the gentility principle', the introduction to *The New Poetry: an anthology selected and introduced by A. Alvarez* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1962).
42. Rem Koolhaas, 'Dali and Le Corbusier: the paranoid critical method', *Architectural Design*, Vol. 2–3 (1978). See also, *Delirious New York: A Retroactive Manifesto for Manhattan* (New York, The Monacelli

Press, 1978/1994), the chapter 'Europeans: Biuer! Dali and Le Corbusier conquer New York', pp. 235ff.

43. See Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (London, Penguin Books, 1977). The *Anti-Oedipus* rejects the paternal authority of the signifier. The frontispiece is a reproduction of Richard Lindner's machinelike 'Boy with machine (1954)', for whom, presumably, we are not signifier machines but machines. For an architectural foray into schizo-analysis, see Andrew Ballantyne, *Deleuze and Guattari for Architects* (London, Routledge, 2007).
44. Lacan asks of Schreber: what happens when there is an appeal to the name of the father that is answered not by the absence of the real father (the signified is always absence, hence the need for signification), but by the absence of the paternal signifier, any signifier, signification itself. Cf 'On a Question prior to any possible treatment of psychosis', in Lacan, *Ecrits, op. cit.*, p. 465.
45. Colin Rowe, Fred Koetter, *Collage City* (Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1978): cf. the chapter 'Collision City and the Politics of "Bricolage"' for the comparison between the city of total control and collage city. Lewis Mumford, *The myth of the machine: techniques and human development* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1967), especially Chapter 9, 'The Design of the Megamachine'. The relevant part of President Eisenhower's 'Farewell Address to the Nation' (1961) is printed at [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military%E2%80%93industrial\\_complex](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military%E2%80%93industrial_complex) (accessed 27/02/13). This page contains extensive references for this term.
46. Wajcman and Jonckheere use the concept of intimacy in their debate in the online journal *S*: see Gérard Wajcman, 'Intimate Extorted, Intimate Exposed', and Lieven Jonckheere, 'Response: The Politics of "Atopia of the Intimate"' in *Contemporary Art: the view from Lacanian Psychoanalysis*, in *S—Journal of the Jan van Eyck Circle for Lacanian Ideology Critique*, no. 1 (2008).
47. Beckett pushes the capacity of language to support subjectivity to its breaking point. Witness, for instance, *Not I* (1973), two stills of which are shown in this paper. Or the opening lines of *Texts for Nothing IV* (1951/1966), 'Where would I go, if I could go, who would I be, if I could be, what would I say, if I had a voice, who says this, saying its me?'. Or the opening lines of *The Unnamable* (1952/1959), 'Where now? Who now? When now? Unquestioning. I, say I'.